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ABSTRACT 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE COST OF CAPITAL OF MNCs 
AND U.S. DOMESTIC FIRMS 
May 1934 
Rahul Kumar Bishnoi 
B. Engg., University of Roorkee, Roorkee 
M.B.A., Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad 
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts 
Directed by: Dr. Joseph E. Finnerty 
This research study can be broken down into three segments. The 
first deals with an interesting, yet little explored, comparative rela¬ 
tionship between cost of capital and leverage in matched sets of MNCs 
and U. S. domestic firms. In the analysis carried out in a cross-sectional 
framework, the MNCs do start out at a lower level of cost of capital as 
conjectured, but, after the intersection between the curves for the two 
groups, change to an over-riding position due to a greater drop in their 
share prices caused by a larger price variability at a higher leverage. 
The two cost of capital models used show significant statistical differ¬ 
ences in the regression coefficients. Also, the results obtained in the 
cross-sectional framework show stability in the ten year period used to 
substantiate the claims in a time series analysis. 
vi i 
In moving away from a comparative framework, the other two 
sections are intended to explore deeper into specific operational as¬ 
pects of the multinational corporations exclusively. The MNCs are first 
taken as a group and two separate multiple regressions run with cost of 
capital and leverage taken individually as the dependent variable and 
sales volume, industrial diversification, and country-wise expansion 
representing the independent variables. The empirical results obtained 
point to a significant negative correlation between size and cost of capi¬ 
tal as well as size and leverage. With greater industrial diversification 
is associated a higher cost of capital although no significant correspon¬ 
dence with leverage is borne out. Finally in this section, the results 
support our hypothesis of a fall in cost of capital and a rise in leverage 
along with the country-wise expansion of MNCs. 
The third segment of the study focuses on the actual transitional 
phases of MNCs in the process of growing. This is accomplished by analy¬ 
sing the individual MNCs before and after an event to note the corres¬ 
pondence with leverage and cost of capital. The results obtained do 
statistically supportthe notion of a decreasing cost of capital and 
rising leverage with expansion in the country-wise operations of an 
MNC, and vice-versa. 
vi 11 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
In their path-breaking article, Modigliani and Miller (henceforth 
MM) put forward a thesis that, apart from a tax effect and bankruptcy 
risk in an economy with a perfect capital market having no transaction 
costs, a company's average cost of capital is independent of the degree 
of leverage in its financial structureJ 
A world of taxable corporate incomes with tax deductibility of 
interest payments, puts debt in a more favorable light. In their correc- 
2 
tion paper , MM offered a solution to the seeming failure of corporations 
to reap the tax advantage of debt financing. They hypothesized that the 
corporations would prefer to maintain substantial reserves of high-grade 
borrowing power with the motive of avoiding a forced flotation of under¬ 
valued common stocks. 
It is generally accepted that, as leverage increases, pre-tax 
overall cost of capital declines up to a moderate level of debt although 
due more to market imperfections rather than the tax effect factor alone. 
Only on crossing a (certain) threshhold level of debt, where pre-tax mar¬ 
ginal cost of borrowing exceeds the cost of capital, does a major differ¬ 
ence of opinion come about between the two schools of thought. 
The traditional view held that once the leverage becomes unaccept¬ 
able to the debt markets because of increased risk, overall cost of capi- 
1 
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tal is forced to rise with the rising cost of incremental debt. This 
phenomenon leaves behind in its wake an optimal leverage, defined in 
terms of a point or as a range. 
MM, on the other hand, placed their faith in the over-all cost 
of capital remaining constant. They believed the rise in debt to be 
accompanied by a falling cost of equity capital due to the action of 
arbitrage operators. The two schools, with their loyal supporters, 
have conceptual differences (see figures 1 and 2). 
Miller, in his Presidential address to the American Finance 
Association in 1977, demonstrated that, while a unique optimal level 
of aggregate debt exists for the corporate sector as a whole, the indepen¬ 
dence thesis still held for value and leverage at the level of the indi¬ 
vidual firm. In other words, the economy as a whole would be a more 
likely candidate for possessing an optimal debt-equity mix rather than an 
individual firm. He further emphasized that the results would be expected 
to hold even in the presence of taxes. 
MM contend: 
Thus, while it is still true that the owners of a levered 
corporation have the advantage of deducting their interest 
payments to bondholders in computing their corporate income 
tax, these interest payments have already been "grossed up", 
so to speak, by any differential in the taxes that the bond¬ 
holders will have to pay on their interest income. The ad¬ 
vantage of deductibility at the one level thus merely serves 
to offset the disadvantages of includabi1ity at the other. 
Miller's results^ were confirmed in a recent study done by DeAngelo 
and Masulis (1980) using a state-preference model. Arditti (1977) found 
regression coefficients for leverage to be generally negative (except for 
the oil industry) and never significantly positive. 
3 
Figure 1 : The Traditional Version of 
Cost of Capital Curves 
Figure 2 : Modigliani and Miller Version 
of Cost of Capital Curves 
Source: Solomon, Ezra, "Leverage and the Cost of Capital", 
Journal of Finance (May, 1963) 
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More recently, in his 1982 Presidential address to the American 
5 
Finance Association , Modigliani conceded that although leverage can 
be valuable, yet it can only be modestly beneficial, since the indi¬ 
vidual tax savings are regarded as subject to risk by the market rather 
than as a sure perpetuity as assumed in MM. 
In rejecting Miller's conclusions arrived at in his 1977 paper, 
Modigliani alleged "... that these counterfactual implications came 
from failure to properly take into account the role of diversification 
in a world of uncertainty and risk aversion." He further proposed that 
inflationary pressures tend to increase the value of leverage besides 
accentuating the clientele effect resulting in polarization of portfolios 
among people having the same risk tolerance. 
It should, however, be noted that both, MM and the traditional 
school, do subscribe to the viewpoint that debt does become excessive 
once its incremental cost exceeds the over-all cost of capital. In com¬ 
menting on the diversity of observed viewpoints, Robichek and Myers6 con- 
cluded: 
Perhaps, ironically both the M&M and traditional position 
now seem to point to the same conclusion: That there is some 
degree of leverage which will maximize the value of the firm. 
This is an important conclusion, even though we cannot pin¬ 
point which combination of debt and equity financing is optimal. 
The theory of finance deals with the allocation of resources through 
time between individuals and firms. For a firm in the uni national environ 
ment, financial decision-making is concerned with maximizing the wealth of 
its stockholders. The basic model of wealth allocation is a special case 
of choice under certainty and thus is constructed under conditions of cer 
5 
tainty and perfect capital markets. It is later extended to incorporate 
uncertainty with the implicit assumption that a perfect capital market 
exists. With market imperfections brought in, the growing complexity 
of the model now leads one closer to reality but also requires explicit 
assumptions for practical ease in application. 
As a further step, the decision rules devised for the single¬ 
country environment may be attempted to be modified considerably to find 
new usage in a multinational case. Such an attempt to extend the domes¬ 
tic theory of cost of capital to a two-country environment^ does provide 
further stimulation to the issue. Once over the national boundary, 
global economy and multi-currency systems create a whole new set of 
rules which may not have a counterpart in the uninational system. The 
international environment, stimulating as it may well be, is also fraught 
with many pitfalls. The financial problems of MNCs are not different 
from those of the domestic firms, but the answers to these problems are 
quite different. 
In a theoretical sense, the complexities involved in devising and 
achieving an optimal financial policy can be turned to one's advantage 
with a certain amount of caution and effort. One has to zealously 
guard against the temptation of adopting simplifying decision rules 
whereby the optimality may be sacrificed for practical ease in an uncer¬ 
tain international setting. The development of a more versatile set of 
tools is an ongoing endeavor of the international researcher. 
The present research was motivated by a desire to examine a hypo¬ 
thesized comparative difference in cost of capital between domestic and 
6 
multinational firms due to transnational financing opportunities, ex- 
change-rate risks, varying levels of debt capacity and inflation, dif¬ 
ferent taxation policies and accounting practices, diversification op¬ 
portunities abroad among possibly semi independent national economies, 
also diversification services for investor, operating economies and 
organizational differences, capital repatriation restrictions, segmented 
capital markets, political and economic risks etc. 
The analysis is carried out for a homogenous set of matched U. S. 
MNCs and domestic firms in a cross-sectional as well as time series 
framework. The purpose behind this exercise is manifold, first, to em¬ 
pirically test the hypothesized relationship between the cost of capital 
of MNCs and domestic firms; second, to examine the possibility of statis¬ 
tically significant differences in the regression coefficients of the 
cost of capital models used for the two groups of firms in a cross-sectional 
analysis framework; third, to check the robustness of the above differences 
in a time-series analysis; fourth, to find the relationship among volume 
of sales, leverage, and cost of capital; fifth, to analyse the changes 
occuring with industrial diversification; sixth, to focus on the changes 
likely with the expansion of MNCs into a greater number of countries; 
seventh, the possibility of expansion in foreign operations of an indi¬ 
vidual MNC is explored; and finally, the study concentrates on the 
shrinking foreign operations of an individual MNC. 
In this attempt to study the relative cost of capital of MNCs, 
while taking leverage as the other variable to define the space for the 
propositions, matched sets of domestic firms were used. As shown in 
Figure 3, when used in a comparative framework the results were expected 
Figure 3 Cost of Capital Curves in a Comparative 
Framework of MNCs and U.S.Domestic Firms 
Figure 4 : A Situation of Intersecting 
Cost of Capital Curves 
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to show the relative position of cost of capital curve for the MNCs when 
compared to the curve for domestic firms. This provides an answer to the 
first proposition and food for thought for the others when individually 
tested later. 
A lower cost of capital curve for the MNCs probably indicates lower 
operating risks and costs which can translate into a higher profitability 
potential. 
A situation of intersecting cost of capital curves, as depicted in 
Figure 4, was certainly not ruled out. Depending on the consistency and 
signficance of such a result, a more concentrated research effort was 
envisaged to obtain greater insights into this interesting, but by no 
means simple, development of intersecting curves. 
The study has interesting implications for practicing finance 
managers of multinational enterprises besides suggesting directions for 
future research in this expanding and important field of international 
business. 
CHAPTER II 
PRIOR RESEARCH ON THE TOPIC 
Two bodies of research literature coexist to help understand the 
international financial environment. One deals with the integration/ 
segmentation of the capital markets. The second is an enquiry, both 
theoretical and empirical, into the various operating aspects of the 
MNCs. The two will be taken up separately in what follows. 
Briefly, segmentation is the word used to refer to a noticeable 
absence of interest on the part of individual investors to hold an inter¬ 
national portfolio of investments. The studies undertaken tend to sup¬ 
port the notion that capital markets around the globe are substantially, 
o 
though imperfectly, integrated. Researchers such as Agmon, Solnik, Logue 
et al, Chen etc. provide evidence to suggest sufficient integration, while 
Grubel, Levy and Sarnat, Cohn and Pringle, and Subrahmanyam believe other¬ 
wise and demonstrate it to be so. 
The apparent disinterest may result from either one of the two 
causes. First, regulations designed by a national government for the pur¬ 
pose can deter individual investors. The corporations, however, can re¬ 
sort to indirect foreign investment and may not be affected by such a 
censoring activity. The second reason for an investment constraint may 
simply be a lack of knowlege of global investment opportunities, on the 
part of a private individual. 
9 
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Explicitly incorporating segmentation and exchange-risk, Adler 
and Dumas (1975) demonstrate that incomplete investor diversification 
must be substituted by diversification undertaken by a value maximizing 
firm. They, however, stress that segmentation is not a property of the 
stochastic returns on assets and hence cannot be tested directly but 
should rather be hypothesized by an international model to test the col¬ 
lected data. 
Analyzing further on similar lines, Lee and Sachdeva (1977) con¬ 
clude that under conditions of perfect competition, investors exercising 
direct control over foreign investment decision would derive the same 
level of welfare as would be attainable through indirect foreign invest¬ 
ment by value-maximizing MNCs. But the situation does not remain condu¬ 
cive to optimal welfare in conditions other than that of perfect competi¬ 
tion. Also, partial integration of completely segmented capital markets 
leads to improvement in the welfare of country one investors at the ex¬ 
pense of welfare of country two investors. It is, however, interesting 
to note the simplifying and restrictive assumptions of the CAPM besides 
those of equal risk-free rates in both countries, a non-stochastic 
foreign exchange-rate, and a constant market price of risk used by the 
authors in arriving at the above mentioned and connected results. 
Domestic theory of financial decision-making has been attempted to 
be extended to the multinational environment in at least three published 
and much discussed cases. 
Adler^ postulated that partial barrier to capital transfers can be 
accommodated by the traditional single-country entity but further speci¬ 
fication would be needed for an adequate treatment of the impact of ex- 
11 
change-risk on earnings and borrowings abroad. 
MM's propositions on the valuation of the firm with regard to its 
capital structure have been attempted to be used, as an extension to the 
MNCs, by Krainer (1972). He initially considers "a world where firms 
make physical investments and finance within a single national capital 
market but portfolio investors are free to make investments in different 
national capital markets." In a later section he further explores the 
firms which make physical investments and have the opportunity to issue 
securities in different national capital markets. Assuming no corporate 
income taxes he demonstrates the non-applicability of MM's propositions 
due to exchange-rate and repatriation risks which put two otherwise iden¬ 
tical foreign and domestic firms in different risk classes. 
Ruediger Naumann-Etienne (1974) incorporated corporate income taxes 
and obtained similar results but under the simplifying assumptions of 
applicability of a single world-wide tax rate. 
Hughes, Logue and Sweeney (1975) analyze market perception of risk, 
return, performance, and stock pricing of MNCs. They conclude: 
"Our results tend to confirm the view that investors correctly 
perceive the diversification benefits of shares of multinational 
firms and that such firms do indeed do something for investors. 
Moreover, they lend some further credence to the notion that 
financial assets are priced internationally, rather than domesti¬ 
cally, which, in turn, implies that financially markets are inte¬ 
grated internationally and that multinational firms assist this 
process. But this still leaves the question of why it appears 
that markets are not integrated." 
Going back to the classical theory of international capital movements, 
one notices the role played by the risks associated with exchange rates and 
repatriation of income and capital which offers a theoretical justification 
to the cost of capital transfer. 
12 
The question posed before by Hughes, Logue and Sweeney on market 
integration finds an answer in an earlier paper by Tinic and West (1974). 
The authors rely on the classical theory of international capital move¬ 
ments and substantiate the position that markets are highly integrated 
internationally. They had performed a comparative study wherein security 
transactions in Canada were found to be significantly more costly than in 
the U. S. and hence had a justifiably higher security returns after adjust¬ 
ing for risk. 
Robbins and Stobaugh (1973), on the other hand, did not support the 
argument of effective capital market segmentation, at least for the MNC. 
They argue that the MNC can effectively overcome restrictions to capital 
flow through intracompany physical and monetary transactions. In other 
words, the authors, while not necessarily denying the existence of an ef¬ 
fective segmentation for domestic firms or private investors, would first 
explore factors like level of technology, proportion of subsidiaries wholly 
owned, ratio of current assets to total assets, and degree-of produce di¬ 
versification for MNCs to check the applicability of restrictions. Rob¬ 
bins and Stobaugh develop the argument further by proposing a mathematical 
model on system-wide funds flow optimization. 
Agmon (1972) researched the issue of capital market segmentation in 
a more general vein while studying the interrelations among equity markets 
as the topic for his doctoral dissertation. He gave unequivocal support 
to the use of one-market model at least for equity securities on the 
basis of the presence of a substantial relation between equity markets in 
major industrialized countries. 
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The effect of leverage under a more realistic securities market 
system, than what MM used, has been more recently attempted by Murphy, 
Ofer, and Satterthwaite (1975). The authors consider (a) absolute, but 
not the relative and (b) absolute and relative values of companies, with¬ 
in a raisk class when the market consists only of four-basic securities: 
a riskless security, two debt securities, and a pure equity security. 
They prove five theorems in comparing two firms, called firm one and firm 
two, in their exposition. The first is their analogue to MM's proposition 
1 and is quoted below. 
". . . if capital markets are perfect, then firms one and 
two have equal market value regardless of the presence of de¬ 
fault risk and regardless of firm two's leverage." 
Later, they do incorporate the effect on absolute market values of 
firms due to a change in the leverage of the second firm. 
Rao (1972) leaned towards a comparative framework in testing the MM 
independence hypothesis for a developing economy i.e. India and for the 
American utility and multi-industry samples. He also tested the net in¬ 
come theory whereby the expected yield on the firm's equity is not affected 
by its financial structure. 
His regression results did not lend support to the independence 
thesis in the developing economy where the capital market is less developed 
and less efficient. But the thesis of independence between the tax-adjusted 
average cost of capital and the financial structure of the firm is supported 
by the tests performed on the American utility and multi-industry sample. 
The author believed these results to be more conclusive than those of the 
yield tests. 
14 
Wippern (1966) obtained results on a cross-sectional analysis 
of fifty firms from seven diverse industries which are clearly incon¬ 
sistent with the net income theory. The problems of equivalency of 
risk class is encountered while testing for the capital structure ef¬ 
fects on the value of a firm and its cost of capital. To solve this 
problem, he combined operating risk and financial level to obtain a 
variable and used it in the analysis. 
Primarily to increase the number of observations available for 
significance testing, a combination of time-series and cross-sectional 
regression analysis was done by Wright, Young and Barton (1966). They 
used a sample of ten Australian retail companies over the time-span of 
1954-63, which represented a period of stable currencies. In the study, 
inter-firm differences unrelated to capital structure were found which 
could not have been possibly obtained in a pure cross-sectional study. 
The actual operational determinants of corporate financial struc¬ 
ture in five countries were studied by a consortium of five researchers.^ 
The sample used by them contained 816 firms in four industries. France, 
Japan, The Netherlands, Norway, and the U. S. were the countries studied 
during the period 1966-72. 
The authors found exchange rate to be a highly significant deter¬ 
minant of debt ratio in all countries except France. Growth rate in 
assets was highly significant only in the U. S. and Japan, and marginally 
significant in Norway and The Netherlands. Earnings risk, on the other 
hand, acquired high significance as a determinant in Norway, Japan, and 
the U. S. but not so in The Netherlands. Finally, coming as a surprise 
15 
to the researchers and also contradicting the normative model of optimal 
structure was the finding that higher earnings risks were associated with 
higher debt ratios. This observation was very pronounced in the case of 
Japan and the U. S. where "EBIT was used as the measure of earnings, thus 
removing financial structure effects on the data." 
A more recent unpublished doctoral dissertation^ is on the subject 
of capital structure of MNC's foreign affiliates. It controls for such 
factors as country, industry, and ownership which were found to be sig¬ 
nificant determinants of the capital structure of the subsidiary. The 
study focuses on U. S. MNCs' foreign affiliates in Mexico and Brazil to 
analyze and compare their financial behavior and capital structure. The 
author did not find the international capital market to be perfect and 
concluded that financial and investment decisions of the MNC cannot be 
completely separated. 
In contrast to the work of MM, another unpublished doctoral 
12 
dissertation also shows that investment decision and financial decision 
are determined simultaneously. Four samples, namely, manufacturing sub¬ 
sidiaries in developed countries, and in less developed countries, petro¬ 
leum subsidiaries in developed countries, and in less developed countries, 
provide the cross-sectional data for the structural model used. 
Interestingly, the model, which is far from universal, was able to 
explain the data better for manufacturing subsidiaries in developed coun¬ 
tries than for those in less developed countries. The author concludes 
that models based on traditional microeconomic concepts fail to adequately 
capture the activities of international firm, especially since his data 
4 
comprised of manufacturing and petroleum sectors, which represent 
horizontal and vertical integration respectively. 
CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH ISSUES, DATA DEFINITION AND SOURCES 
Before getting down to the heart of the problem, it needs to be 
reiterated that there is no conflict on the issue of a decline in the 
over-all cost of capital with a 'judicious' increase in leverage. The 
traditional view, however, does strongly differ on the hypothesized con¬ 
stancy of cost of capital proposed by MM for an individual firm even when 
leverage is increased beyond the point of rising marginal cost of debt. 
This research focuses on an interesting, yet little explored, re¬ 
lationship between cost of capital and leverage in matched sets of MNCs 
and domestic firms. An empirical study would be carried out of the 
sample firms which would be expected to provide us with greater insights 
into the explanatory variables for the relationship advanced in the cost 
of capital models being used. 
The problem itself can be introduced as follows. 
The environmental conditions under which a multinational firm 
operates exert a wide variety of constraints while also providing unique 
opportunities for the enterprise. An MNC seeks to maximize financial re¬ 
turns for the entire operations irrespective of its business status and 
establishment abroad--whether as a wholly owned subsidiary, a joint ven¬ 
ture, or only as a licensing operation. Earlier, under fixed currency 
valuations, individual countries developed relatively stubborn economic 
characteristics, like a source of materials, cheap labor or high tech- 
17 
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nology. But with the advent of floating exchange rates, strategies for 
the MNCs must now be based on flexible relationships between nations. 
The units located abroad transact in a wide variety of currencies 
which poses foreign exchange risks due to the relative exchange rate 
fluctuations over time. This risk is not only of great importance and 
concern to financial managers of MNCs but also to international port¬ 
folio investors and international bankers too. The effect has been felt 
by these market participants in terms of significant real and paper fluc¬ 
tuations in earnings. The current system is a mixture of floating and 
fixed exchange rates. Forecasting techniques, to help formulate policies 
for reacting to exchange rate fluctuations, are still in its infancy and 
very much dependent on a better understanding of the functioning of the 
international monetary system. Under the system, not only is the foreign 
exchange rate determined but the international trade and capital flows 
accommodated and balance-of-payments adjustments made. 
The exchange rate fluctuations are caused by many factors including 
but not limited to the demand and supply of various currencies in the 
world markets. A healthy growth or even survival of the foreign operations 
depend upon a close monitoring of the exchange rates along with an ability 
to forecast the future after considering the politics of devaluation be¬ 
sides a multitude of economic indicators. The host-countries' business 
cycles, balance-of-payments, growth rate of money supply, differential 
inflation rates, and even accounting rules for exchange gains and losses, 
all play their part in the final analysis. 
In late 1981, the Financial Accounting Standards Board issued FASB 
#52 to revise its old FASB #8 which dealt with the method of accounting 
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for foreign currency translations. Inconsistencies like accounting for 
sales at current exchange rates while cost of goods sold and depreciation 
being translated at the 'historic' exchange rate caused large variations 
in the reported income of MNCs whenever exchange rate fluctuations took 
place. FASB #52 requires all translations to occur at the current ex¬ 
change rate besides other provisions. These, however, would not affect 
MNCs who do not operate through fully integrated and self-contained sub¬ 
sidiaries. 
Exchange controls may just be the tip of the political iceberg and 
greater risks of expropriation cannot simply be wished away. The very 
high rate of expropriation, since the second world war, led many researchers 
to undertake studies designed to explore the issue in detail. Harvard Busi¬ 
ness School's "Multinational Enterprise Project" data base was used by 
Bradley (1977) to discover the most important common characteristics of 
his sample of 114 affiliates of U. S. firms expropriated during 1960-1976. 
He found technology barriers, degree of vertical integration, size of as¬ 
sets, and composition of ownership to be the most important characteris- 
ti cs. 
The most likely candidates for expropriation were found to be firms 
with a middle-level of technology, not belonging to a vertically integrated 
firm with parent controlling affiliates' supply or market, with a huge as¬ 
set base, and started as a joint venture with the host government or even 
with a foreign MNC. The last conclusion is, interestingly, quite contrary 
to the popular opinion. Bradley does believe that the probability of re- 
13 
ceiving a compensation increases in such a case. 
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The income tax implications to a firm, of translation, economic, 
and transaction exposures, are important since the tax treatment does 
vary considerably from country to country. Unlike translation and economic 
gains and losses, however, those arising from transactions are recognized 
as taxable income as and when realized. Hedging operations may be used 
to offset transaction exposure and are accorded different tax treatments 
depending on its purpose as pure speculation or for a business dealing. 
As per a recent survey of 315 Multinational firms drawn from For- 
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tune's 1000 largest U. S. industrials , practicing managers were actively 
using hedges and swaps. They were focusing more on translation and trans¬ 
action exposures which had resulted in firms being more vulnerable to eco¬ 
nomic exposure. 
The modern theory of corporation finance believes maximization of 
stockholders' wealth to be the major objective of a firm. This goal ac¬ 
quires complications in an international setting where host-country politi¬ 
cal, economic, and even cultural aspirations may directly or indirectly 
pose conflicting objectives to a firm. The private enterprise system 
itself does not find followers in all parts of the world. Certain countries 
do not have even a semblance of free enterprise system and a substantial 
portion of their economy is not characterized by a profit motivated pri¬ 
vate sector. The public policy abroad may also create insurmountable 
barriers requiring abandoning or at best compromising the firm's goals to 
avoid being trapped as an unwelcome intruder. 
It has been an ongoing effort on the part of political scientists, 
armed with advanced statistical techniques, to forecast political inter- 
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ference and explain the inherent risk. The models devised have, un¬ 
fortunately, suffered from a lack of generalization to MNCs since more 
often the intended application was for a narrow purpose. Either the con¬ 
sultant was catering to the particular needs of a client multinational 
firm or the State department was the ultimate user to formulate policies. 
An ecological approach by Knudson (1974) to predict political risk 
ex ante was one of the pioneering works to come to grips with the problem. 
His model came quite close to correctly classifying Latin American coun¬ 
tries on the basis of data for the period 1968-71. The model itself is 
based on the level of national frustration, as measured by aspirations 
minus welfare/expectations and is depicted in Figure 5. 
Economic constraints operate through the monetary, fiscal, and 
balance-of-payments policy instruments. More recently, protectionism 
has once again reared its ugly head prompted by the recessionary world- 
trade environment. The problem has acquired serious proportions and 
threatens to damage the fabric of free-trade system itself. 
While on the one hand, the world countries are getting more inter¬ 
dependent with the common desire for peace and prosperity, on the other, 
it is getting more and more difficult to build international agreement. 
The complex and often contradictory nature of the basic interests of 
nations makes it tougher to even arrive at and agree to the principles 
for working out their differences. Behrman (1974) judges the acceptabil¬ 
ity of international agreements according to the criteria of efficiency, 
autonomy, participation, equity, and creativity. 
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A degree of national protectionism has always been recognized as 
part of the international business climate. But an already high level 
of governmental restrictions coupled with the rising nationalistic feel¬ 
ing predict only the worse to come in the years ahead. Numerous instances 
make the business news whereby specific restrictions reported range from 
imposition of import quotas, tariffs and duties, price controls, licens¬ 
ing restrictions, foreign ownership limitations, geographical limitations 
on expansion, nationality restrictions on management and directors, local 
sourcing requirements regardless of quality standards, local manufacturing 
requirements, abrogation of rights to royalties, dividend and capital re¬ 
patriation restrictions, and nationalization to expropriation. 
Plain political expediency may just be the starting point for eco¬ 
nomic constraints and may lead to economic imperialism in its extreme 
form. Even the home-country government can constrain international in¬ 
vestment. Ideologically, maintenance of competition should be the only 
objective of the rules employed over business but in amending the local 
laws for applicability overseas, intervention can result, though inadver¬ 
tently and with no ill-will against MNCs, as discussed ahead. 
Taxation is one area where, over time, differential taxation around 
the world resulted in the formation of tax havens. Subsequently, local 
governments got involved and took some preliminary action to remedy the 
situation in 1962. Tax deferrral, until the income travels back to the 
U. S., and determination of arm's length sales are other connected areas 
which developed alongside. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) rulings also 
affect the U. S. parent directly in terms of policy making and formulation 
of strategies. 
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Patents and technical knowhow have been tried to be kept under 
control by the government with the intention of preventing the information 
from landing in the wrong hands overseas which can harm national interests. 
In the U. S., certain technologies are prohibited from export and some 
world destinations are forbidden to receive them even through third coun- 
tries. 
Antitrust regulations stemming from the Sherman Antitrust Act of 
1890 and the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 (later strengthened by the 
Robinson-Patman Act of 1936) become applicable to MNCs through their 
licensing of patents, trademarks, and knowhow. The complexities involved 
in the interpretation and application of the regulations have at times 
deterred U. S. parent companies from ties abroad which might result in 
antitrust indictments. 
SEC requires all companies seeking to sell stock on American mar¬ 
kets to report activities of their associates. Fluctuations in exchange 
rates and diverse accounting procedures only tend to complicate the con¬ 
solidation with parent company accounts. 
Finally, started in the mid-1960s, balance-of-payments controls 
over direct foreign and portfolio investment have become too complex for 
many due to the expansion, modifications, and relaxations made therein. 
Various potential sources of concern for the future have been identified 
which can make the task of MNCs more difficult. Amongst these, global 
unionism, implications of worker participation in management, and wage 
increases in excess of productivity gains would tend to accentuate the 
labor problems. In the more distant future, shortage of industrial raw 
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materials, energy, and food would have a negative global impact affecting 
the MNCs. Intensified competition, in international markets of the 
future, when coupled with consumerism and ecological concerns may harm 
the interests of some nations more than the ones with less ecologically 
conscious citizens. 
Cultural norms, religious beliefs, local norms, and social heritage 
may at times not be conducive to the religious and cultural heritage of 
an MNC, which may be blamed of 'cultural degeneration1 of the local in¬ 
habitants as per the host-country standards of values and ethics. No 
international codes of conduct exist to offer operating guidelines in 
such a situation where the MNC may end up losing more than just its image. 
The law and order situation in some countries has posed a direct 
threat to the safety of the MNCs' personnel posted abroad. Kidnapping, 
property damage, extortions and unprovoked violence are no longer just a 
headache for the diplomatic corps alone. In certain countries around the 
globe, the deterioration in conditions now threatens to disrupt normal 
industrial growth and business for the MNCs. 
Sometimes, the foreign subsidiaries are 'advised' by the local 
government to localize their capital structure to conform to the industry 
norms and cash flow patterns in the host-country. This can, at times, 
be equated to a veiled threat directly from those in positions of power 
in a foreign land. 
The above exposition serves at least one major purpose: it makes 
us aware of the greater risks present in the open economy environment of 
the international trade setting. All along one can feel a building up of 
one, perhaps natural, conflict. Is MNC the only good way of effectively 
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organizing international trade and exchange? After focusing on this 
valid question, we shall get back to the more academic, yet practically 
important, issue germane to this research. The later conclusions and 
results draw upon the above storehouse of relevant data to be of practi¬ 
cal usage to the academician and practitioner alike. 
Trade existed even in the Biblical times. Direct investment, how¬ 
ever, began only some three hundred years ago. It was started more as 
a form of commercial relationship between the metropolitan powers of 
Western Europe and their colonies. At around the turn of this century, 
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U. S. firms had established operations abroad. Quoting Behrman: 
The Multinational Enterprise (MNE) is in one sense, a mutation 
of earlier types of international companies; in another sense, it 
is the extension of the modem U. S. giant corporation onto the 
world market, but without the necessary political and economic 
institutions to guide and protect it. 
A distinguishing factor of the MNC is its world-wide perspective 
in operations and a centralized decision-making unit when compared to a 
highly localized production structure of a colonial investment and the 
use of local resources by the international holding companies to serve 
local customers. 
The incorporation of Domestic International Sales Corporation 
(DISC) in 1971 to encourage U. S. merchandise exports met with an ex¬ 
pected amount of criticism levelled on both, ideological and practical, 
grounds. A DISC enjoys privileges of tax-deferral plus non-applicability 
of intracompany transfer pricing rules set by the IRS for exports. Any 
large MNC was believed to benefit by being able to shift more profits 
away from a DISC when compared to an integrated small firm. Even the 
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U. S. trading partners felt the DISC legislation to be providing an 
unfair competitive edge to the exporters in the United States. 
Are the international financial markets efficient and do systematic 
relationships exist in view of the expected presence of informed and 
rational participants? Further, does the basic risk-return concept of 
finance apply here for MNCs to promise greater returns? If it does, then 
why do we hear frequent outcries of 'profiteering' against MNC's operations? 
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Hymer presents a well balanced view of MNCs before contending that 
the age of the MNC is at its end, unless it can mobilize political power 
to be in phase with the economic power created out of an expanding world 
market. He praises the MNC first. 
The Multinational Corporation, because of its great power to 
plan economic activity, represents an important step forward over 
previous methods of organizing international exchange. It demon¬ 
strates the social nature of production on a global scale, and 
as it eliminates the anarchy of international markets and brings 
about a more extensive and productive international division of 
labor, it releases great sources of latent energy. 
In supporting the opposite viewpoint for a balanced perspective, 
Hymer blames the MNC for having a partial outlook, creating hierarchy 
and spreading its benefits unequally, eroding the cohesiveness of national 
states, creating universal interdependence, and increasing cleavage be¬ 
tween international and national interests. 
This brings us back full circle to our basic research issue, 
namely: 
Can international segmentation of the capital markets, diversifica¬ 
tion opportunities abroad, transnational intracompany financing and other 
connected factors taken up earlier, be expected to give us a lower overall 
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cost of capital for an MNC, which can translate into lower operating 
costs and a higher profitability potential? Comparatively speaking, 
whether the overall cost of capital works out to be cheaper or dearer 
for a multinational corporation is an empirical issue here. It would be 
followed by a discussion on the subject. 
The hypotheses, being proposed for empirical and theoretical re¬ 
search in a cross-sectional as well as a time-series framework, can be 
set up as follows: 
If kpC and k^ are the respective cost of capital estimates of 
matched samples of domestic and multinational firms, and fQC and f^ 
are the respective regression coefficients of domestic and MNCs in the 
cost capital models set up, then: 
kDC = f (DC) 
= f (firirfs systematic business risk, level of total promised 
payments, and associated probability of bankruptcy; pre¬ 
sent value of tax subsidy on debt payments, minus the pre¬ 
sent value of expected bankruptcy costs, and minus the pre¬ 
sent value of the after-tax operating earnings the bondholders 
lose where they are not sufficient to cover the cost of bank¬ 
ruptcy).17 
and kMN = f (MN) 
= f (the above domestic variables pi us international diversifi¬ 
cation, foreign exchange and political risks, full disclo¬ 
sure of operating results, taxes on earnings retained 
abroad, access to international sources, financial structure 
determined by its host-country norms and other relevant fac- 
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The effect of the earlier mentioned variables may be positive, 
negative, or unknown at this stage. Thus the overall effect on the two 
cost of capital estimates needs to be studied and tested. The hypotheses, 
in Null and Alternate forms, are given after a statement of the proposi¬ 
tions, as follows: 
Proposition #1: Matched on leverage, cross-sectional samples of domestic 
firms will have a higher cost of capital than the MNCs. 
Proposition #2: The cost of capital models for the MNCs and domestic firms 
will have significantly different regression coefficients (at^= .05 level) 
in leverage and cost of capital space. 
H0B : fDC * fMN 
H1B : fDC = fMN 
Proposition #3: The higher cost of capital, for the domestic firms matched 
on leverage with the MNCs, will be stable over time. 
Proposition #4: With higher sales volume (lower sales volume), MNCs have 
associated a lower (higher) leverage and lower (higher) cost of capital. 
If 'k' and T indicate cost of capital and leverage respectively, 
while '$$' denotes the firm with the higher $ volume of sales than the 
other denoted by '$', then 
30 
Proposition #5: With greater industrial diversification of MNCs comes 
a higher leverage and a higher cost of capital. 
and 1, Hnr : If MN.j becomes MN„. , then k 
0E ‘ . i ""j * ,'MN. / kMN. and 'mNA’mN. 
" vJ * vJ 
where j = i + 1 (or a higher numeral) =# of industries 
H , c : If MN. becomes MN • , then kMM \ kMNI and 1MM \ 
IE l J MN.- // MN. MN^ 
Proposition #6: Expansion of MNCs* operations into more countries cor¬ 
responds to an increase in leverage and a fall in the cost of capital. 
If 1I* and ‘J1 denote the # of countries, and 
J = I + 1 (or a higher numeral), then with MN 
becoming MNJ 
H 
I 
: 1....1 ( 1MNJ and k^I k„„J 
'MN' 
,J and k,.KI  
IF * ‘MNV 'MN" "MN 
MN 
kw.,J 
'OF * 'MN 
Proposition #7: An expansion in the number of countries an individual 
MNC operates in would be felt with a lowering of the cost of capital 
and a higher leverage. 
If an arrow >—► * notation is used to denote the direction of change 
to a higher or a lower level, then with an Mn| becoming MN^ 
hog : k 
H1G : k 
MNd I 
MNd I 
]MNd t 
and 
and 1 
Proposition #8: A shrinking number of foreign operations for an individual 
MNC translates into an increase in cost of capital and a fall in leverage. 
Retaining the notations used earlier, if MN^ becomes MN-j 
H0H : kMNj J 
H1H : kMN j 1 
and 
^mn| I 
X l 
and 
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Data Definition and Sources 
The research project involves a variety of issues which are now 
addressed. The close relationship among the issues permits the use of 
a single comprehensive set of data covering the period 1960-1982. 
There can be at least two ways of altering the leverage, if de¬ 
sired. As per Solomon (1963), the firm can issue debt to redeem out¬ 
standing stock, or alternatively, it can expand with more debt being is¬ 
sued to acquire additional funds. MM used the former method while Solo¬ 
mon showed preference for the latter. 
Earlier, in introducing the research, various factors contributing 
to a hypothesized difference in cost of capital of MNCs and domestic 
firms were identified. These are listed in Table 1, along with the 
variables to be used for their measurement and the sources thereof. 
For testing the propositions, the necessary data needs to be col¬ 
lected for each of the variables involved. In Table 2, each proposition 
is taken up, variables are identified, and the sources indicated for the 
time-horizon mentioned before. 
Our objective initially, is a comparison of the cost of capital for 
the two groups of firms in a cross-sectional framework where samples, 
matched on leverage, provide the necessary data. 
For the second proposition, the regression coefficients in the poly¬ 
nomial relationship of leverage with cost of capital can be jointly tested, 
as illustrated later in the section on methodology. 
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TABLE 1 
RELEVANT FACTORS, VARIABLES, AND DATA SOURCES 
FOR MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 
Factors Variables Sources 
1. Transnational financing # of countries MNC is operating 
opportunities in, government restrictions 
2. Exchange-rate risks Quoted foreign currency exchange 
rates, and changes therein 
3. Varying levels of debt ca- Host country standards, present 
pacity and inflation level and preferred industry 
range; Quoted inflation figures. 
4. Different taxation policies Accrued/deferred/estimated taxes 
and accounting practices payable and changes, actual tax 
rates; Accounting Standards 
Boards or equivalent. 
5. Diversification opportuni¬ 
ties abroad 
Local government attitude toward 
foreign businesses, world economic 
and trade environment 
6. Diversification services 
for investors 
MNCs' investment abroad, Agencies/ 
Brokers involvement for investors 
7. Operating economies and 
organizational differences 
8. Capital repatriation re¬ 
strictions 
9. Segmented capital markets 
Country's business climate, local 
customs/cultural differences 
Balance of payments figures, 
foreign department relations 
Government policies for foreign 
investment by firms/private in¬ 
dividual s ★ 
10. Political and Economic Political system stability (index); 
risks Propensity to expropriate models 
and country indicators from consult- 
 ing organizations. 
* Due to substantial overlaps plus space limitations, the sources are 
listed separately as follows. 
Sources: 
1. International Financial.Statistics, International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
Washington, DC. 
A monthly publication, since 1952, providing data on exchange rates, 
inflation, international liquidity, money and banking, international 
trade, prices, government finance, interest rates, etc. 
33 
Also available (from IMF) are: 
Balance of Payments statistics for over 110 countries, published 
monthly; 
Direction of trade statistics for over 135 countries, monthly 
publication; 
Exchange arrangements and exchange restrictions, yearly Government 
Finance Statistics yearbook for revenues figures, and amount of 
grants, financing, lending, and expenditures of central governments 
of over 124 countries. 
2. Political handbook of the world, McGraw-Hill publications. 
3. World currency charts, American International Investment Corporation, 
San Francisco, California. 
/ 
4. International Tax Summaries, A guide for planning and decisions. 
Coopers and Lybrand International tax network, Ed. Alexander Beyer, 
John Wiley & Sons. 
Also on taxation: 
Tax & Trade guide of countries by Arthur Anderson & Co. 
5. The World's directory of multinational enterprises--J. M. Stopford, 
J. H. Dunning, and K. O.Haberick, Facts on File Inc., New York. 
It contains data on Industrial diversification by MNCs by main industry 
6. U. S. Department of Commerce, Government Information service. Publica¬ 
tions include: 
Survey of Current Business 
Foreign Economic Trends, and 
International Economic Indicators. 
7. Country reports entitled 'Doing business in-1 by Price Waterhouse & 
Co. It deals with investment climate and accounting besides providing 
a country profile. 
Similarly, individual countries are taken up for an in-depth study of 
the business opportunities by Ernst & Ernst International series. 
8. Economic handbook of the world, McGraw-Hill, dealing with domestic 
trends, structure of economy, and future directions. 
9. The Statesman's yearbook, Ed. John Paxton, St. Martin's Press, New York 
It contains data on international relations, justice, religion, educa¬ 
tion, welfare, statistical publications, economy, etc. 
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10. For financial ratios: 
Dun & Bradstreet, Key business ratios, 99 Church Street, New York: 
updated annually. Also, 
Robert Morris Associates, Annual Statement Studies, Philadelphia: 
annually published. 
11. The Business Failure Record, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., New York: up¬ 
dated annually. 
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TABLE 2 
DATA SOURCES FOR VARIABLES IN THE PROPOSITIONS 
Proposition 
Number Variable Data Sources 
1, 2, 3 Leverage Debt 
Equity 
Industrial Compustat/ 
Firms' Balance Sheet/10-K Report 
Cost of 
Capital 
Dividend 
EPS 
Income Statement of the firm/S&P's 
Corporation records 
' g‘ 
E/P 
1 g1 2 3 in EPS (above source) 
Dun & Bradstreet key business ratios/ 
Business Week yearly report card 
Market Moody's Industrial 
Price Guide/S&P's Corporation records/ 
Industrial Compustat 
Beta Merrill Lynch/Value 
Coeff. Line 
V Long-term U. S. T. bonds 
V S&P 500 Industrial stocks. 
4 Sales Sales($) Fortune 1000/Income Statement of Firms 
5 Industrial 
Diversifi¬ 
cation 
# of Ind. 
covered 
World's directory of MNEs, Facts on 
File, Inc., New York 
6, 7, 8, 9 Country- 
wise ex¬ 
pansion 
# of 
countries 
MNC is in 
Who owns Whom directory 
Notes: 1. More than one reliable source is available for the above data, 
hence, basically for illustrative purposes, one or two sources 
have been picked for citing. 
2. Table 1 provides some additional international data sources 
along with complete references. 
3. For leverage. Debt to Assets (D/A) and Debt to Equity (D/E) 
are interchangeably used. They are simple transformations 
of each other as shown: 
D/A = (D/E)/(l+D/E) 
and 
D/E = (D/A)/(1-D/A). 
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In a time series analysis, the third proposition is tested with 
the help of several years of data collected on the two variables. 
In moving away from a comparative framework, the remaining proposi¬ 
tions are intended to explore deeper into specific operational aspects 
of multinationals exclusively. 
The hypothesized relationship between sales, cost of capital and 
leverage is put to test in the fourth proposition. It would help find 
the correspondence between volume of sales, as a measure of the size of 
a corporation, and leverage and cost of capital. The relative differences 
in size of the corporations in the data is used to focus on the importance 
of sales as a likely explanatory variable. The relationship of cost of 
capital and leverage is then tested with the data obtained on the number 
of countries an MNC is operating in, the number of industries into which 
it has diversified, and the changes in both over the years. 
The top performers in any industry can be expected to be broadly 
abiding by a narrow range of leverage proven over time to be most desirable. 
For finding industry leaders, a good starting place may be the first and 
1Q 
second Fortune 500 listings where the top 1000 industrial firms in the 
U. S., by sales, are listed every year. For bringing in good data in terms 
of matched samples for our empirical analysis and research, another rich 
source can be the Moody's Industrial Manual, which publishes more financial 
statistics and gerater operating details with yearly updates. By concen¬ 
trating on a selected section of the manual, a good randomized sample can 
be obtained for both the groups of firms. 
It was decided to take this alternative for data collection, with 
help from other sources including the Fortune 500, and published company 
37 
material, 10-K reports, etc. as and when required. Here, extraneous 
factors in the economy and possibly other factors unique to the time 
period would also have an unbiased effect and as such would not be ex¬ 
pected to confound the true relationship being sought with the help of 
the identified variables. 
In censoring with the aim of delineating the effect of extraneous 
factors on the results, greater care is certainly desirable in view of 
the MNCs' open-economy environment presented by the nature of the study. 
Even in selcting a year for the first-stage cross-sectional analysis, no 
global phenomenon unique to the time period was allowed to cloud the main 
issue under investigation. 
The sample is assessed for an industry-wise categorization into 
domestic and multinational corporations. The classification of MNCs into 
industries is based on the field of business of its U. S. parent. 
At this stage of data definition, it would seem desirable to reach 
some understanding on our use of the term 'multinational', before taking 
up the variables for a discussion. 
A Multinational Corporation 
There is more than one way for a firm to earn the multinational 
title.^ Researchers need to be wary of the possible pitfalls in the in¬ 
clusion of certain firms while discarding others at the time of collect¬ 
ing the sample data. Thus it is very important to recognize the hetero¬ 
geneity of the field and have a proper orientation to the definitional 
debate, whidiis more than just a matter of semantics. 
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Wilkins (1970) found direct foreign investment by American firms 
to have a long history and to include "a surprising number of . . . 
U. S. headquartered multinational manufacturing companies. . 
21 
In the sequel to the above study , the author reported the book 
value of cumulative U. S. direct foreign investment, expressed as a per¬ 
centage of GNP, to be in the range of seven to eight percent in 1914, 
1929, and 1970. The term multinational enterprise (MNE), however, was 
coined neither in 1914 or 1929 but seems to be of much more recent origin. 
D. E. Lilienthal was probably the first to use the term 'multinational 
firms' in a paper delivered at Carnegie Institute of Technology in April 
1960. He defined it as "corporations which have their home in one country 
but operate and live under the laws and customs of other countries as 
well."22 
Rolfe (1970) defines an international corporation as one with a 
foreign content of twenty-five percent or more. He uses foreign content 
to mean the proportion of sales, investment, production or employment 
abroad. Here, it should be noted that 'international corporation' can be 
taken to be synonymous with the more widely used American term 'multi¬ 
national corporation'. 
Basically for the purpose of clarity, it is imperative to differen¬ 
tiate between the interrelated and sometimes overlapping concepts of inter- 
national business, foreign business and comparative business. In foreign 
business or comparative business, business processes are understood to in¬ 
volve only one country at a time, which is quite unlike that in international 
business. 
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Another aspect of this definitional debate is rather succintly 
brought out by Robock and Simmonds (1973). 
A multinational firm would be one which allocates company 
resources without regard to national frontiers but is nationally 
based in terms of ownership and top management. A transnational 
firm would be a multinational firm managed and owned by persons 
of different nationalities. A supranational firm would be a 
transnational firm that is legally denationalized by becoming 
incorporated through an international agency, when, or if, this 
possibility exists. 
Olivier Giscard d'Estaing places emphasis on the ownership aspect 
for defining multinationality by pointing out that a 'truly multinational 
enterprise' makes available the stock of its local subsidiary or of the 
mother company in all countries where it operates. Aharoni (1971) 
talks about the structural element by which the criterion would be the 
number of countries in which a firm is doing business. 
The 'performance' school would define a firm as multinational ac¬ 
cording to performance characteristics like earnings, employment, assets 
or sales, and depending on its well-being and growth resting in more than 
one country. A corporation having a larger percentage, than the cut-off 
limit, of one of the above variables being used would be classified as an 
MNC. 
Following the behavioral approach, the top management of an MNC would 
be required to 'think internationally' to qualify for a multinational title. 
The touch of imprecision and arbitrariness inherent in this approach de¬ 
terred the researchers from adopting it without any modifications. 
Steiner (1966) put together performance characteristics with the be¬ 
havioral element to come up with a definition of a multinational corporation 
as quoted ahead. 
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... a multinational company meets at least two criteria. 
First, it does business in two or more countries in such volume 
that its well being and growth rests in more than one country. 
Second, its management makes decisions on the basis of multi¬ 
national alternatives. 
Vagts (1973) starts out with the startling revelation that: 
To speak of 'the multinational enterprise in the United 
States' would be a misnomer in that the salient feature of the 
multinational enterprise is the degree to which it is not in 
the United States, the degree to which its activities spread 
out over national boundries. 
He goes on to give the most comprehensive and cover-all definition 
whereby a multinational enterprise is very large, has a deep purse and 
rich resources, thinks internationally, breaks down into a cluster of 
separate corporate entities, is organized under the laws of different 
countries, tends to be rather heavily oriented towards research and 
development, and finds itself in a more or less oligopolistic type of 
competition. 
The significance accorded size in the definition provided by 
Vernon (1972) is noteworthy from the viewpoint of the global power of these 
giant organizations. He considers a firm to be a multinational if it has 
an annual turnover exceeding $100 million and has manufacturing facilities 
in six countries or more. The more common methods of expansion for a 
multinational-to-be are vertical or horizontal integration. Sometimes it 
can expand by transfer of technology to the developing economies which 
can later export back to the developed economies, including that of the 
parent. 
But it is still very difficult to mark the end of transition, for 
a domestic firm in the process of becoming a multinational. One can 
hardly specify a stage at which a firm ceases to be a domestic and joins 
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the ranks of an MNC, and not face opposition from contemporary researchers. 
Even with the assumption of a perfectly gradual and accepted evolution of 
an MNC from a domestic operation, there can be no guarantee to that degree 
of international commitments remaining constant over time. A reversal to 
domesticated operations is possible which once again poses the problem 
of demarcation between the two theoretical business existences. Finally, 
the legality of incorporation and later controlling interests can con¬ 
ceivably give an MNC the dual-nation state which would further complicate 
the controversy over definition. 
If a firm has at least one subsidiary operating outside the United 
States, the parent in the U. S. would be in a position to take advantage, 
at least in financial terms, of the availability of an additional market 
besides that of the local capital market. Thus, for our research on com¬ 
parative cost of capital, we draw the line at only within-the-country 
manufacturing facilities and operations to separate the domestics from 
the MNCS. 
Variables 
Leverage factor, which would stand for a ratio of the book value 
of debt to total assets, is used along with the cost of capital to de¬ 
fine our space wherein the empirical test has been carried out. The use 
of book value (preferred by many financial managers, and most lenders and 
rating agencies) can be supported as follows. 
For finding empirical support MM had relied on two earlier studies 
of forty-three large electric utilities (F. B. Allen, 1954) and forty-two 
oil companies (R. Smith, 1955). Weston (1961) criticized MM on the use 
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of an uneven spread of leverage observations in the utility sample, which 
exhibited skewness towards the higher ranges, namely 50% to 80%. The 
oil industry sample, while not implicated in the above observation, did 
pc 
however, found disapproval in not approximating a homogeneous risk-class. 
The possible existence of a sample bias due to the simultaneous 
appearance of 'market value of all securities' as the denominator of both, 
the X and the Y axex, did not, however, go unnoticed from MM. But what 
was a passing reference for them seemed to acquire more serious and damag- 
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ing proportions after the investigative treatment accorded it by Barges. 
As shown by Barges, the use of market-value debt/equity ratios to 
measure financial risk leaves the regression line suspect in attempting to 
reflect the true relationship. The three explanatory situations hypothe¬ 
sized by the author concern two firms identical in all respects except 
1) in the geographical market they serve, 2) in scale, or 3) in their 
growth rate. A later chapter in his published work reinforces the author's 
arguments by presenting actual evidence on the issue. 
The applicability of the aforesaid could not have been greater for 
our research wherein a comparative framework of MNCs and U. S. domestic 
firms deals with markets of differing risk-classes, firms of varying 
scales and growth rates and opportunities. Our basic premise could other¬ 
wise be compromised due to the possible biases resulting from the market- 
value data reflecting something other than just the difference in business 
risk. 
Perhaps a brief illustration with figures would help prove the point 
better. As shown below, two identical firms are assumed whose current 
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earnings equal the expected profits in future. In a tabular form, 
the results look like: 
F i rm M F i rm D 
Book debt (= market debt) $12 m. $12 m. 
Book equity 20 m. 20 m. 
Book debt/equity 60 % 60 % 
Net income for common equi ty $2.4m. $2.4m. 
If Required rate of return (Yield) 15 % 12 % 
Then Market equity $16 m. m. 
& Market debt/equity 75 % 60 % 
Basically the mere fact of Firm M serving a larger market. , or 
expected to grow faster, or with a more actively traded stock due to a 
size differential makes investors require a higher rate of return. Identi¬ 
cal earning figures for the two firms thus demand that market-value of com¬ 
mon equity of Firm M fall to accommodate the higher expected return ($2.4 m. 
divided by 15% gives $16 m. as the market equity). The implication is now 
clear once we recall that market-value of a security reflects the expecta¬ 
tions of the average investor. 
An assumed identical book-value of debt (equalling the market-value 
of debt) for the two firms translates into a lower market-value of equity 
and hence a higher market-value of debt/equity ratio for the riskier, 
larger, or the more growth oriented firm. The bottom line here is that 
the variation in yield due to financial risk is lost due to more imposing 
firm characteristics which confound the relationship actually sought. 
On the other hand, the use of book-value debt-equity ratio produces 
no such dubious results. Furthermore, the causal relationship starting 
from market-value debt/equity ratios and leading to market yield changes 
(taken as the independent and dependent variables respectively) implies 
influence of the 'presumably widely used' market-value ratio on investor 
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decisions. Book-value ratio would more likely be used by an average 
investor and hence would seem to be a more deserving candidate in re¬ 
searching the issue at hand. The average debt ratio, determined not too 
long back for the non-financial U. S. corporations, was found to be a 
rather low figure of around 20%. This led to a certain amount of criticism 
of the MM correction paper of 1963, which had postulated that the firms 
would find it rewarding to maximize their use of debt financing under the 
prevalent system of a proportional corporate income tax. 
For some time, bankruptcy costs found acceptance as the logical ex¬ 
planation for this discrepancy and which had some how missed the notice 
of MM. Soon, however, debt capacity became recognized as the issue demand¬ 
ing priority attention since firms would consider optimal capital structure 
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only if the debt capacity had not been reached. 
Kim (1978) showed that the optimal capital structure involves less 
debt financing than the firm's debt capacity and that is where firms 
choose to remain. 
Cost of capital, the dependent variable in our research study, has 
been defined and used in many different ways by various researchers. It 
is one of the controversial and unsettled issues in finance literature. 
The meaning and measure of a firm's cost of capital varies with the back¬ 
ground of the user, for example, businessperson, economist, accountant, 
or even a lawyer.29 It has been the subject of numerous enquiries and we 
would do well to explore the meaning as a business researcher before at¬ 
tempting to calculate the variable. 
The term "business capital" includes not only tangible property but 
also intangibles like goodwill, patents, and mangerial skills. These ac- 
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cumulate with the growth of a business concern and have been recognized 
as contributing to its earning power. Business capital is acquired through 
funds coming from current liabilities and long-term debt, common and pre¬ 
ferred stock, and retained earnings. Taking into account the prices that 
determine current values for future payoffs of the funds, a composite rate 
or average cost of capital can be worked out and this would also ensure 
incorporation of the market values in the calculation. To maintain this 
market value of the firm's securities, the management should strive to 
match the expectations of the investors. In this sense it is a dynamic 
concept swayed by the opinion waves of the market participants. They 
would be optimizing their return through risk diversification in the 
risk-return tradeoff available. 
To interpret the cost of capital in an efficient market, an equi¬ 
librium amongst investor, firm, and the market is ideally sought, although 
not easily provided. Besides, each source of capital has long been recog¬ 
nized as having an explicit cost, yet implicit costs, such as those of 
short-term credit have continued to be ignored. The theoretical realms 
leave behind the practical ease and applicability at this stage; further 
investigative research is warranted here. 
In practice, the term 'cost of capital' was earlier understood to 
mean the cost of either debt or equity funds. Later, a weighted average 
of the two types of capital, taking into consideration the dependence of 
both on debt ratios, was recognized as a better measure. 
Taking the components separately, the cost of debt can be defined 
as the equilibrium required rate of return on a risky corporate bond. 
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The cost of equity was, in the early sixties, believed to be a function 
of the firm's equity investment rate. After more research it was accepted 
that the two were independent of each other. But once again the theoreti¬ 
cal work done by Gordon and Gould (1978) supports their older belief "that 
the cost of equity in a firm is an increasing function of its investment 
rate." 
Also in cost of equity capital, the difficulty remains in trying 
to measure the expected rate of return of the equity-holders. Both, 
dividends and earnings, qualify equally to measure returns, and each view¬ 
point has a following in the academic circle. 
Durand addressed the issue of cost measurement in some detail and 
concluded:30 
Given a method of security appraisal, the cost of raising 
capital can be both defined and measured (italics added). At 
the same time I have tried to show that there is at present 
no generally accepted system of measuring costs. 
The concept of weighted average cost of capital leads us to the 
issue of an optimal level of debt financing. Although there still is no 
generally acceptable system of cost measurement, the issue of debt being 
less expensive than equity is no more controversial. It is agreed that 
debt becomes excessive once its incremental cost exceeds the overall cost 
of capital. 
MM advanced a differing viewpoint in proposing that "the average 
cost of capital to any firm is completely independent of its capital 
structure and is equal to the capitalization rate of a pure equity stream 
31 of its class. 
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Fama and Miller (1972) provide another interpretation of this 
variable in defining it as "the minimum required expected rate of re¬ 
turn on incremental outlays for production activities of the particular 
risk class available to the firm." 
Clark, Clark and Elgers define cost of capital as . . some 
measure of how earnings should have increased with each increment of 
capital,"32 
The variable is controversial, as explained earlier, but especialy 
so in connection with its measurement for research purposes. Durand 
(1952) preferred the Net Operating Income approach to the Net Income ap¬ 
proach for working out the capitalization rate but with possible modifi¬ 
cations for book-value, beside others. The later researchers have con¬ 
tributed to the literature on cost of capital but no resolution seems in 
sight, at least so far. 
The market-value versus book-value aspect has been adopted by 
various researchers to suit their requirements. Even a proxy market-value, 
composed of the book-value of the security divided by the interest rate 
for its risk class, can be a likely candidate to be tested for its effec¬ 
tiveness as a measure. 
One commonly used definition is the ratio of NOI as a percentage 
of the value of all securities. Three other approaches can be outlined 
as follows. 
(a). Using the Capital Asset Pricing Theory, the expression for the 
security market line is: 
EO^) = Ff + B1 E(Rm) - Rf 
where 
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E(R.j) and E(Rm) represent the expected returns on security 'i', 
and a broad market index of securities, respectively. is the risk¬ 
free rate of interest, and is the Beta coefficient which measures the 
volatility of E(k^) as a function of the change in E(Rm). The Sharpe- 
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Lintner-Mossin equilibrium relationship for any individual risky asset 
1 i' in the market 'm' is given as 
E(R.) = Rf + [E(Rm-Rf] cov (Ri, Rm) 
o-^(Rm) 
where cr(R) is the standard deviation of the rate of return. 
The relationship simplifies to 
E(Ri) = Rf + A Cov (Ri,Rm) 
Hamada (1969) derives the following equilibrium equation for X » the 
market price per unit of risk, to replace the MM arbitrage operation. 
X = [E(XA)-RfDb-nBRfPb] 
<r- k Cov (xk.SA) 
st k=l 
where 
nB is the number of shares 
Pb is the price per share 
E(Xa) is the expected earnings net of depreciation but prior to 
the deduction of interest and tax payments 
RfDb is the interest payment which is not assumed to be a random 
variable, and 
SA is the (present) equilibrium market value of the equity of a 
corporation A. 
(b). For security 'i', the cost of capital in the Gordon Durand model is 
given by 
ki = D-j/Pq + g with 
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D-j representing the expected dividend in the next period, PQ being 
the current market price of the security, and 'g' as the rate of growth 
of the security. 
(c). For the ith security 
k. = E/P 
can be interpreted as the ratio of the earnings 'E1 per share to the 
price *P1 per share of the security. 
In an attempt to create a true and unbiased research environment 
with freedom from clearly avoidable correlations among variables, the 
cost of capital should not be ideally measured by the ratio of net in¬ 
come as a percentage of market-value of all securities. The reason being, 
the more is the degree of homogeneity amongst the factors and leverage, 
the greater would be the expected correlation in the observed relationship. 
In view of the book-value figures for leverage, the obvious next 
step is to avoid using book-value of a security divided by the interest 
rate for its risk-class as a definition of cost of capital. Further 
critical probe tends to disfavor the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
and the Gordon Durand model for cost of capital since these depend on 
estimates of Beta coefficient and expected dividend value respectively, 
which are actually provided by brokerage firms and not by an average in¬ 
vestor. 
Thus by the process of stage-wise elimination, we arrive at our 
definition of cost of capital as Earnings per share as a percentage of the 
market-price paid by an average stock-holder of the company in a particular 
year. The average stock price is calculated from the highest and the low- 
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est quoted prices for the year, after adjustments have been made for 
any stock-splits and stock dividends. 
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Methodology 
A visual relationship between leverage and cost of capital is 
obtainable by plotting a scattergram. This graph shows a systematic 
relationship among the data, which can be tried to be approximated by a 
mathematical equation and a good fit of the regression of cost of capi¬ 
tal on leverage obtained. 
A linear regression line of the type 
k = a + bl 
indicates the intercept 'a' on the vertical axis and slope (or regression 
coefficient with "ordinary least squares" estimation) 1b1 for the relation¬ 
ship. OLS is appropriate for estimating recursive systems i.e. multiequa¬ 
tion models that are hierarchical and which contain independent error 
terms across equations. 
If the scattergram so warrants, a polynomial regression is used for 
fitting a curve instead of a linear regression line. The proportion of 
variance incremented by the cubic term in a polynomial regression is 
generally very small, hence more often a second degree polynomial of the 
form 
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k = a + b-|l + b^l suffices. 
This is an intrinsically linear model and thus can be reduced to a 
linear form by suitable transformation. The variable can then be used in 
a multiple regression analysis, after being brought in heirarchically 
from a lower to a higher degree of the polynomial. The significance of 
an increment in the proportion of the variance accounted for is testable 
with an 1F ratio'. It can be used for other connected testing purposes 
also as given ahead. The ratio is to be calculcated in the form 
where 
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F . ^2k,1,12 ~ ^k.lVW 
(1 - R2k>1>12)/(N-kr1) 
N = the sample size, and 
k-j and k^ are the degrees of freedom for the larger and the smaller 
2 
R respectively. 
The statistical significance of the b's is noted from the F ratios. 
In taking only the quadratic form of the equation, the higher-order poly¬ 
nomials are relegated to the error term which increase slightly but is 
offset by the benefit of an increase in the degrees of freedom. The final 
deciding factor is the goodness of fit exacted from the polynomial equation. 
After getting the degree of polynomial that fits the data, the regression 
equation can be calculated. The data can hardly be expected to exactly 
conform to a mathematical form, at times due to probable errors in data 
collection too. 
In interpreting the parameters b's, first, the difficulty presented 
by the representation of a variable by more than one vector needs to be 
recognized; second, the relative magnitudes of the b's do not easily lend 
themselves to a comparison because of increasingly larger variances of 
the higher-order terms; third, the correlations among the vectors change 
due to linear transformation. While being aware of the above difficulties 
for a better interpretation, it is also important to note the positive 
aspects. First, it helps in reducing the high multi col linearity generally 
existing among powered vectors; second, the linear transformation of '1' 
does not adversely affect the proportion of variance accounted for by the 
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hierarchical scheme of introduction of the polynomials. 
The data is to be analyzed by the 'Regression' program of the Time 
Series Processor (TSP). The data on dependent and independent variables 
for the two groups of firms would be read as input and the various vectors 
needed for calculating the 'F ratios', as per the formula given earlier, 
would be generated. As an example, the two regression curves for MNCs 
and domestic firms can be tested to see if they are parallel by obtaining 
the F ratio with the help of the calculated vectors. A nonsignificant F 
ratio would indicate that the curves are parallel. The difference between 
the two R 's, can then be tested for knowing if the intercepts of the two 
parallel curves differ from each other. Another nonsignificant F ratio 
would signal no difference between the cost of capital curves of the two 
groups. 
The empirical findings are scrutinized to help explain the relation¬ 
ships obtained by the statistical process. The theoretical overtones need 
to be elaborated to be useful for practical applications in an international 
setting. In the discussion stage, a greater usage of the financial infor¬ 
mation about the firm is envisaged. 
In working with the data on cost of capital and leverage for the 
past several years, the first six hypotheses were expected to pose no 
major practical problems. The remaining two propositions, however, make 
use of data on relevent multinational corporations only which qualify. 
Thus, even for the larger time-period selected, a relative paucity of 
data in testing these special issues was not unanticipated. Finally, 
directions for future research are outlined by pointing to the open 
questions. 
CHAPTER IV 
TESTS CONDUCTED IN COST OF CAPITAL AND LEVERAGE SPACE 
The research issues involved in the first part of the empirical 
tests carried out on the data collected for MNCs and U. S. domestic 
firms concern the following: 
a) the relative positioning of the cost of capital curves when 
matched on leverage; 
b) the hypothesized difference in the regression coefficients 
of the cost of capital models used for the two groups of 
firms, and finally 
c) a test of stability in the time series framework of the cross- 
sectional results obtained earlier. 
In a comparative framework, as used here to study the cost of capital 
differences in MNC's and U. S. domestic firms, the criterion of distinctly 
identifying the two independent groups assumes greater importance. Our 
definition of a multinational corporation explicitly recognized that a 
corporation operating in more than one country would be in a position to 
take advantage of its access to more than one capital market. This helps 
in delineating the MNCs from domestic firms which operate in one country 
alone. 
Further concentrating only on the larger industrial concerns, with 
actively traded stocks, as necessitated for the identifiable impact on 
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the price per share, the likelihood of a shrunken sample size for 
U. S. domestic firms did not go unnoticed. If obtained with adequate 
randomization, a sample size of 35 would work out to be adequate for 
empirical testing. Keeping this in mind, it was decided to compile a 
list of 40-50 domestic companies which were publicly held and had pub¬ 
lished data available. The particular industry to which they belonged 
was of no practical consequence, as the sample was to be drawn from a- 
cross the industries. 
The safety margin in the number of companies looked at was meant to 
accommodate the foreseeable possibility of firms dropping out of the 
sarole in a particular year due to various reasons. First and foremost 
was the wave of mergers and acquisitions to hit the corporate world in 
the 70's, which meant the imminent loss of data points over the time 
oeriod selected for this research. Second, at times, certain financial 
information is not disclosed in a timely manner or special circumstances 
render the data unsuitable, as can happen when the firm runs into losses 
for a particular year or is declared insolvent. Third, the degree of 
leverage needed to be explicitly limited to a certain range for capturing 
the essence of debt financing and yet not be overwhelmed by it to over¬ 
shadow the equity financing. 
In thus trying to accommodate a wide range under the above con¬ 
straints, it was concluded that a debt-equity ratio of 5% to 300% would 
serve the purpose well. Besides, noting the expansive moods of the corpora¬ 
tions, it was feared that a good sized domestic firm could be tempted to 
create a foreign subsidy by acquiring an operating firm abroad or setting 
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one up. This would further reduce the domestic sample size. A reverse 
transition from an established multinational to a purely domestic firm 
was less likely as is also evident from the later analysis done in dealing 
with the proposition #8. 
A good randomized sample was the next requirement to add significance 
to the derived results. Moody's Industrial Manual, brought out annually 
and covering major industrial company profiles and financial statistics, 
found acceptance as a good source of data sought. The 10-K reports, filed 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission by individual companies, was 
to be used as a major reference for acquiring further details as and when 
required due to their non-availability in Moody's manual. 
To randomly select a sample, the alphabetically listed corporate 
data were studied to test for their acceptability under the criteria men¬ 
tioned above. Once the list of domestic corporations was compiled, atten¬ 
tion was directed to the multinational corporations listed along with the 
domestic firms in Moody's Industrial Manual. A relative abundance of 
firms in this group helped bring in a good representative and randomized 
sample as follows. 
Recollecting that the MNC's were defined as having at least one 
operating subsidiary abroad; the list of firms was compiled once again 
in an alphabetical order. But now equal weight was given to four sub¬ 
categories, based on the number of countries an MNC was operating in, 
namely, two, three, four, and five or more. 
Once armed with a joint list of about 100 corporations, the data 
were sought from the latest available edition of Moody's Industrial Manual. 
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This 1982 edition carried financial and other company information for 
the year ending December 1981. Since this year was not marked with any 
conspicuous world event to inadvertently bias the comparative figures, 
it was selected as the year for the cross-sectional study. For the 
testing requirements in the time series framework, however, a ten year 
period spanning from 1973-1982 was selected. Here the 1982 data require¬ 
ment actually warranted a second search in the early fall of 1983 when 
the newest edition of Moody's manual was published. 
The basic data needed for testing the first three propositions were 
on leverage and cost of capital. Leverage was earlier taken as the ratio 
of book value of debt to equity. For the corporations studied, long term 
debt along with the preferred stock constituted the purer form of debt 
for research purposes and was so represented in the numerator. The equity 
in the denominator consisted of common stock equity. Both the items were 
used to work out the factor of leverage as a percentage figure. 
The "cost of capital" variable is made up of the per share annual 
earnings of an outstanding stock divided by the average stock price for 
the year in question. The year end earnings figure represents the expec¬ 
tations of the investors since they paid the quoted market price for the 
share at any time in the same year, but surely before the actual earnings 
were discovered and became public knowledge. The earnings per average 
common share figure allowed for adjustments for any extraordinary items 
like net gain on redemption of debentures or reduction for income taxes. 
Similarly, the quoted market price figures took into consideration, and 
were adjusted for, all stock splits and stock dividends in arriving at 
the highs and lows for the year in question. 
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For maintaining a comparative framework in analyzing the cost of 
capital curves the matching is accomplished by sub-dividing the entire 
leverage range, from 52 to 3002, into 60 equal intervals. The cost of 
capital figures would need to be worked out later and compared at the 
two extremities of an interval for obtaining a positive or a negative 
relative placement. If the actual range of leverage on the abscissa 
falls short of the limit of 3002, the two curves would be extrapolated 
to tne limit to find out the trend of the ensuing vertical difference 
Detween them. 
Our first concern here is with the nature of the individual rela¬ 
tionship among the variables. If it is determined that a curvilinear 
fit is better than the linear one, the next step can be to obtain the clos¬ 
est approximation to the exact form, and then attempt to compare the two 
curves at various intermediate points. Normally, the predictive power of 
a polynomial equation, used to describe a set of data, reduces dramatically 
beyond the second degree. It is generally useful to rely on an intrin¬ 
sically linear model where non-linear variables can be reduced to a 
linear form by suitable transformation. The method of ordinary least 
squares can even be used to exact a good fit. 
For a second degree polynomial equation, our independent variable, 
namely leverage, will be raised to the second power to give a quadratic 
equation of the kind 
k - a + bjl + b2l2 
where k andl retain their earlier defined meaning as cost of capital and 
leverage respectively, while a, b-j, and b^ are regression coerficients. 
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In a polynomial regression, the hierarchical analysis starts with 
the first-degree polynomial for which the proportion of variance of the 
dependent variable explained by the independent variable is worked out 
and tested for statistical significance with the help of an F-ratio. 
The next step involves the quadratic function of the independent variable 
and the incremental proportion of variance explained is analyzed for its 
statistical significance. 
The appendix lists out the corporations included in the sample data, 
and which were randomly selected to avoid any bias. 
Empirical Findings 
With the values of variables obtained for use on the abscissa and 
the ordinate, a scatter diagram was also obtained for the domestic firms 
to get a feel for the relative position of the data points through which 
the best fitting least-squares regression lines would then pass. 
The process was repeated for the multinational corporations taken 
as a group. In both cases, this gave an indication of the kind of rela¬ 
tion which best describes the data in addition to providing the degree 
of correlation present, among other things. 
In the case of the U. S. domestic firms, a clear negative correla¬ 
tion was visible although the slope itself showed a tendency to decrease 
as the degree of leverage increased in the financial structure. On the 
other hand, it was interesting to find a positive correlation in the 
data for the multinational corporations. The curves are reproduced in 
Figures 6 and 7. 
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Bringing in the third and fourth power of the independent variable 
did not help matters much. It actually led to a decline in the t- 
2 
statistics and the corrected R values. The best fit was obtained with 
a quadratic function for the multinational corporations and a linear form 
of equation for the domestic firms. 
The cost of capital of MNCs rose at a sharper rate than the decline 
in slope for the domestic group of firms. An intersection of the two 
curves was imminent, although not unanticipated as described earlier. 
Further growth in leverage for this group of MNCs brought a decline in 
the rate of rise as is evident from the change in sign for the regression 
coefficient of the squared term in the equation. 
For a fuller treatment, the two data sets were superimposed on a 
single cost of capital and leverage space. Besides, the computer program 
was further designed to highlight the difference in values of the two 
curves. A printout of the two values of cost of capital and the differ¬ 
ence thereof was demanded at a regular interval of every 5% in the degree 
of leverage. The superimposed curves are shown in Figure 8. The two 
curves intersect at about 45% leverage. 
The results seem to support our first hypothesis about MNCs having 
a lower cost of capital than the domestic firms when matched on leverage. 
However, the intersection between the two curves brings in an additional 
dimension of interest which definitely calls for a deeper probe to pro¬ 
vide a possible theoretical explanation. 
It was thought quite feasible to find the MNCs having a lower cost 
of capital. This can be explained in terms of their higher earnings poten 
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tial in the full range of leverage, but which is accompanied by a still 
higher market price of the outstanding shares, thus leaving an overall lower 
ratio of earnings as a percentage of price when compared to the domestic firms. 
Further, with higher return potential comes an inherently higher riskiness, 
so when combined with an increasing degree of leverage one can expect a 
larger variability in the share prices. This leads to a greater drop in 
share prices for MNCs than that of the domestic firms. At a higher leverage, 
a lower price can thus push the cost of capital of MNCs above that of their 
counterparts, even if we assume the relative earnings figures to remain un¬ 
changed. 
Going back to the date for empirical verification, both the groups of 
sample points were subdivided into two sets each, depending on their rela¬ 
tive position either to the left or to the right of the point of intersection. 
As may be recalled, cost of capital is worked out as earnings over market 
price per share, and leverage is given as debt over equity. The mean values 
for the earnings and prices along with their standard deviations were worked 
out for the two sets in each group. 
In the two sets of firms falling to the left of the intersection, the 
MNCs are higher than the domestic group in earnings by 69.33%, but the cor¬ 
responding price differential works out to be higher still at 89.75%, thus 
the cost of capital curve for the MNCs remains below that of its counterpart. 
On the other hand, to the right of the intersection, the earnings 
differential for the group of MNCs is much higher at 17.04% than the 
price differential of 5.85%, hence the curves reverse their positions as 
E/P of MNCs exceeds the E/P of domestic firms. In addition, especially 
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to the right of the intersection, the standard deviation of the stock 
prices is much higher for the MNC sample when compared to the domestic 
one, although the mean prices are more or less at par for the two groups 
Furthermore, this tendency toward parity in prices is achieved by 
a drastic fall in the mean of the MNCs while being helped by a rise in 
the mean of the domestics, in moving from the left to the right of the 
range of leverage. Also, it is interesting to note that the earnings of 
MNCs remain higher throughout the range when compared to the domestic 
firms. Finally, while both earnings and prices show a decline with an 
increase in leverage for MNCs, just the reverse is true for both the 
factors in the case of domestic firms. 
Lest we take the above, derived from cross-sectional sample alone, 
as the research conclusion, the last portion of this chapter would be 
entrusted with the task of checking our basic premise in a time series 
analysis framework. 
At this stage it has been determined that the curve for the MNCs 
slopes upward while the curve for the domestic firms has a negative 
slope. 
The second hypothesis is intended to go further and check if the 
two cost of capital models used to define the respective curves have 
statistically different coefficients. The hypothesis states that the 
cost of capital models for the MNCs and domestic firms will have signifi 
cantly different regression coefficients in leverage and cost of capital 
space. It is proposed to check the coefficients with the help of an F- 
ratio at the .05 level of significance. 
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The computer program designed for the above uses the best fitting 
curves for the two groups, retrieves the coefficients, and works out the 
F-ratio after formulating and determining the numerator and denominator. 
This value needs to be compared with the critical value obtained from an 
F-ratio table at the appropriate degrees of freedom to reject or accept 
the null hypothesis that the regression coefficients of the two cost of 
capital curves are the same. 
As before, for the best fit, the MNCs are fitted with a quadratic 
equation and the domestics with a linear form of equation. The regression 
coefficients are reported in Table 3. A test of the composite hypothesis 
to determine equality of the two constant terms, linear terms, and the 
quadratic terms is given as 
RSSE-USSE 
= -3- 
USSE 
nl+n2-6 
which is distributed as F(3,n-|+n2“6) under our null hypothesis. 
Here RSSE is the sum of squared residuals on fitting a quadratic 
equation to the combined sample, USSE is obtained on adding the sum of 
squared residuals of the quadratic equations fitted on each sample sepa¬ 
rately, and n-j and n^ are the sample sizes of the two groups of firms used. 
The F-ratio works out to 3.87. The critical value is found to be equal 
to 2.764 at *<= .05. So we fail to accept the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients are the same at the .05 level of significance. 
Having determined that the regression coefficients for the two cost 
of capital models used are indeed different, we now turn to the ten year 
sample for the period 1973-1982 collected to test and establish whether 
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the results obtained in a cross-sectional analysis are stable over time. 
Specifically, in the third hypothesis, we seek to determine the relative 
positioning of the two cost of capital curves in a time-series analysis. 
It is conjectured that the higher cost of capital curve for the domestic 
firms will be stable over time. 
For the data collection, the same randomly picked corporations were 
retained. The data was then taken up individually for each of the ten 
years and subjected to regression analysis. The best fitting curves 
were obtained for which the regression coefficients are given in Tables 
3 through 12. The scattergrams were also plotted to visually examine the 
shape of the curves. The interesting findings are presented below. 
a) In eight out of the ten cases, the MNCs' curves were found 
to have a positive slope. Also, the curves for the cost of 
capital of domestic firms were negatively correlated to the 
leverage in eight out of the ten years looked at. 
b) The curves for the MNCs, in all cases except for 1974, 
started out at a lower intercept than the domestics. 
c) Except for the year 1975, as the leverage increased, the 
vertical distance between the cost of capital curves nar¬ 
rowed and the curves intersected. 
d) Further leverage levels saw an overriding curve for the 
MNCs in the nine cases of intersecting curves. 
e) The curves, when extended beyond the leverage levels 
provided by the data, suggested a widening gap in most cases. 
It needs to be reiterated that an attempt was made toward a compara¬ 
tive analysis with regard to the positioning of the two curves rather than 
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concentrate on the individual curves and the statistical significance 
of their coefficients alone. 
CHAPTER V 
TESTS CONDUCTED ON MNCs ALONE, AS A GROUP 
This chapter focuses only on the Multinational Corporations while 
maintaining the list of randomly selected sample firms compiled earlier. 
Further data was obtained on the annual dollar volume of sales, the num¬ 
ber of industries and the countries an MNC had subsidiaries in for all 
the sample MNCs in the year 1931, which represents the year for the 
cross-sectional study. 
It is interesting to note at the outset that in an earlier study, 
Banz (1981) had empirically established that the smallest firms on the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in the period 1936-1975 exhibited sig¬ 
nificantly larger risk-adjusted returns than the medium sized or the 
larger firms and had called it tne 'size effect'. He did not, however, 
find the size effect to be linear in the market value of the common 
stock or even in the log of the market value. Besides, the effect did 
not show stability over time. 
In his study, Banz goes on to quote Reinganum (1981) who ruled out 
price-earnings (P/E) ratio as a factor that size is suspected to be a 
proxy for. Further, a lot of additional factors, possibly correlated 
with size, need to be tested before the size effect can be suitably ex¬ 
plained in theoretical terms. 
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In our study, the smallest NYSE firms are not anyhow represented 
since the Moody's Industrial Manual offers full and comprehensive cover¬ 
age for only the comparatively bigger firms, thus delegating the few 
smaller firms covered into a standard coverage section toward the end. 
These smaller firms and over-the-counter stocks were never consulted in 
our alphabetical pursuit for the randomized sample used. 
Tables 20 and 21 in the appendix present the relevant information 
on the sales figure, the number of countries and industries an MNC is 
operating in, the cost of capital, and leverage. When dealing with cate¬ 
gorical independent variables, a choice between analysis of variance and 
multiple regression is available to the researcher. The choice, although, 
is a matter of form and not of essence. The decision rests more on the 
person's familiarity with the two methods and the availability of further 
computational tools. However, because of its inherent flexibility in ap¬ 
proach and more direct interpretation in analysis, the multiple regression 
approach has been deemed preferable by some academicians. The arguments 
in favor of using multiple regression gain further momentum when the 
analysis deals with both categorical and continuous variables, as is the 
case here. It was decided to run a multiple regression with sales volume, 
industrial diversification, and country-wise expansion representing the 
independent variables, and cost of capital and leverage taken individually 
as the dependent variable. 
Briefly delving into multiple regression here, the prediction equa¬ 
tion can be given as 
Y' - a + b-jX-j + ^2^2 + 
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with Y' representing the predicted value of the dependent variable. 
It is attempted to optimize the prediction by seeking a least squares 
solution in which different weights are applied to the explanatory 
variables. In this quest for optimized explanation, it is required to 
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calculate the R y*x]x2*“xn 1,e* the scluarecl multiple correlation of Y 
with the independent variables. A complicating factor is the omnipresent 
correlation amongst the independent variables. This is more true in non- 
experimental research where superfluous information is being brought in 
along with the multitude of independent variables. 
After a fairly good idea of the power of independent variables in 
explaining the variance in the dependent variable is acquired, the next 
important step is to determine the statistical significance of each of 
the regression coefficients in the obtained results. 
The F-ratio, as explained in the initial chapters, can be calculated 
with the help of the appropriate degrees of freedom associated with the 
variance of the estimate. The t-statistics is then required to set con¬ 
fidence intervals around the regression coefficients, namely: 
b + t (*/2,df)sb 
where at °V2 with associated degrees of freedom 1 df‘, the tabled t ratio 
is multiplied with the standard error of b, s^. 
Proposition #4: 
The conjecture in the first hypothesis in this chapter was that as 
the MNCs grow larger, as measured by their dollar volume of sales, they 
would simultaneously: 
a), experience a lowering of their cost of capital since with growth is 
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likely a higher share price of the presumably greater number of shares 
outstanding which promotes more active trading. This would reduce the 
ratio even at a possibly higher earnings potential, and 
b). exhibit a tendency to Dorrow more from the international sources 
including the home capital markets. Also, large MNCs can reasonably 
be expected to have professional managers who would have helped achieve 
their leverage capacity in this process of sales growth for optimization 
of their cost of capital. Besides, a higher stock price would strategi¬ 
cally suit equity financing. Thus for their capital needs the bigger 
MNCs would tend to rely more on floating fresh equity although being 
interested in keeping their balance of debt and equity where practically 
possible. The overall effect is likely to be a fall in the leverage 
ratio so a negatively sloped curve is hypothesized when regressed on the 
sales volume. 
The results of the regression are given in the listing of regression 
coefficients in Tables 13 and 14. The statistically significant values 
with the expected signs obtained for the variables confirm our hypothe¬ 
sized relationships. The actual transitional phases of MNCs in the pro¬ 
cess of growing, spread over a number of years, would be ideally needed 
to vouch for our claims but here the MNCs were taken up as a group. How¬ 
ever, this interesting aspect is taken up further in the next chapter when 
the individual MNCs would be analysed before and after an event to see the 
correspondence with leverage and cost of capital. 
Tables 13 and 14 also present other variables since a multiple re¬ 
gression was run and these are now addressed in our analysis of the next 
two propositions in this chapter. 
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Proposition #5: 
An attempt to associate comparative levels of cost of capital and 
leverage with the industrial diversification of MNCs comes next on our 
agenda. It is conjectured that with the more industrially diversified 
multinational corporations will be associated a higher cost of capital 
as the earnings potential increases due to industrial diversification. 
This may result in a higher ratio of earnings over price if we assume 
that the stock prices do not adjust upwards to the same degree as the MNC 
may or may not be perceived to be less risky by an average investor. 
In the second part of the proposition it is hypothesized that re¬ 
lated with a greater industrial diversification is a higher leverage, 
since MNCs would plan on more debt acquisitions rather than issuing 
fresh equity, once the stock prices are known to show no tendency to 
rise. 
Referring to the results in the Table 13 and 14, one notices a 
confirmation of the first part of the hypothesis with regard to the cost 
of capital, but the t-statistics do not point to a significant relation¬ 
ship with leverage. It seems the MNCs do not interpret industrial diver¬ 
sification as a cue to raise or lower their capital base. 
Proposition #6: 
Finally, in this chapter, attention is focused on the correspondence 
between the leverage, cost of capital, and MNCs' expansion into a greater 
number of countries. The hypothesis stated that MNCs operating in a larger 
number of countries would have a lower cost of capital and a higher degree 
of leverage. 
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An explanation for the above relationship can be found in the 
fair assumption that an expansion in the number of countries an MNC's 
operations are spread over can be interpreted as a move toward reduc¬ 
tion in economic and foreign exhange risks. This can lead to a possible 
show of faith and confidence on the part of the stockholders reflected 
in the higher stock prices, which simultaneously cuts the ratio of 
earnings to price. It should be noted that unlike an industrial diversi¬ 
fication, an expansion in number of countries would surely be accomplished 
outside the home-country borders of an MNC. 
As regards the leverage, a U. S. MNC moving into a new country 
would help raise more debt capital abroad since most industrialized 
34 
nations in the world tolerate a higher degree of leverage than the U. S. 
This would be too good an opportunity, to lower cost of capital, for an 
MNC to miss. 
A final look at the Tables 13 and 14 confirms our hypothesized re¬ 
lationship. Significant t-statistics for the variables points to the 
greater likelihood of MNCs operating in a larger number of countries hav¬ 
ing a lower cost of capital and a higher degree of leverage. 
CHAPTER VI 
TESTS CONDUCTED ON INDIVIDUAL MNCs 
The results presented so far in the last two chapters dealt with 
MNCs taken as a group. The analysis attempted to establish the corres¬ 
pondence between various sets of variables for obtaining insights into 
their broad functional characteristics. Here, for the first time an 
ambitious design focuses on individual MNCs to register changes with 
data gathered on before-an-event and after-an-event in the life of an 
MNC. A much wider time horizon was selected by deciding to extend the 
search into the '60s too. 
Proposition #7: 
The first effort is made to check the hypothesized decrease in 
the cost of capital and an increase in the leverage of an MNC with its 
gaining entry into a new country. The data was searched for individual 
cases fittinq the description and carefully screened before being counted 
in. 
Proposition #8: 
The reverse transition, namely an MNC completely abandoning a 
country, was even less well represented. In this second hypothesis of 
a fall in leverage and a rise in cost of capital the paucity of data was 
not unanticipated. However, it helps to fully appreciate the transitional 
phases undergone by an MNC when entering or leaving a country. 
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To rule out any overriding effect of the prevailing economic 
conditions creeping in to bias the results, it was decided to establish 
the results relative to a market index. The Standard & Poor's 400 
Industrials (S&P 400's) was the index used to give a ratio of earnings 
and price to compare with as follows. 
For each of the data items used in the sample, a corresponding 
value of earnings and average market price of S&P 400 for that particu¬ 
lar year was obtained. However, the index could be established only for 
comparing the cost of capital since no leverage figures for the same or 
any other comparable indexes are available. The figures for both, the 
sample of firms and the index, are given in Tables 15 through 17. The 
tables also cover the collected data for the relationship with leverage 
as sought in the propositions. 
Propositions 7 & 8--Part I—Empirical results: 
First we deal with the correspondence between cost of capital and 
the event of an MNC enterina or completely withdrawing from a country. 
From the tabulated data on before-the-event. a set of figures were worked 
t 
out which give the difference between the sample data and the index, thus 
providing an effective usage of the index as a base. The process was 
repeated for after-the-event data. 
The positive or negative percentage change in the transition from 
before-the-event to that of after-the-event was then calculated, and the 
mean and standard deviation worked out. The hypothesis thus transforms 
to testing whether the mean of difference between the two data points is 
significantly different from zero. Based on the t-values obtained, the 
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null hypothesis of no significant difference from zero at a certain 
would need to be rejected to accept our hypothesized relationship. 
The first proposition gives a t-value of 2.26 for a sample of 
thirty firms and is significant at ^=0.025 in a one-tailed test. This 
clearly supports the hypothesis of a fall in cost of capital of an MNC 
corresponding to its entry in a new country. However, we fail to accept 
our null hypothesis, of a reverse correspondence with an MNC totally 
withdrawing from a country, only at a 15% risk level. At <*=0.15, the 
t-value of 1.37 compares favorably, but falls short of the critical value 
of 1.38 at *-=0.1. 
Propositions 7 & 3—Part II--Empirical results: 
Moving on to the correspondence with leverage in the two proposi¬ 
tions of this chapter, as explained before, no index is available to 
standardize the leverage figures on. So the relationship of leverage 
with the event was worked out simply as a percentage change between the 
two years of data on either side of an event. Both the propositions 
tested on the data show a highly significant correspondence. 
In the first hypothesis, the sample size further reduces to twenty- 
seven since three data points have a zero value of leverage, which is not 
acceptable. Actually in one of these three cases, an increase from a 
leverage of zero to a positive number would have translated into a meaning¬ 
less infinite change corresponding to the event. The t-value obtained 
is 1.94 which relates favorably to the critical value of 1.7056 at °^=.05. 
In the second proposition of this chapter, which also happens to be 
the final one, the t-value for the sample of ten is calculated at 2.13 
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which compares well with the critical t-value of 1.83 at °< = .05 again. 
Thus in both the cases we fail to accept the null hypothesis of no sig¬ 
nificant change from zero corresponding to the event. In other words, 
the results indicate confirmation of our hypothesized relationship of 
a fall in the cost of capital and an increase in the leverage of an MNC 
when it gains entry into a new country. Further, the reverse relation¬ 
ship with both, cost of capital and leverage, is confirmed when an MNC 
completely abandons a country. 
CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The empirical findings in a research study can be said to have 
served their purpose well in helping to enrich the existing literature 
and knowledge if they can be freely translated into practical usage with 
the help of a simply framed theoretical contribution. In what follows, 
an attempt is made towards this goal while summarizing the research and 
in drawing conclusions. 
We started with MM's seminal paper on cost of capital, capital 
structure, and corporate valuation. The authors believed "the average 
cost of capital to any firm to be equal to the capitalization rate of a 
pure equity stream of its class." The theoretical question where they 
dramatically differed with the traditionalists was on whether or not the 
average cost of capital curve shows a decline as debt increases. MM hypo¬ 
thesized complete independence, which did not fit in with the traditional 
view of a declining curve. Further, MM have themselves advocated contra¬ 
dictory opinions on capital structure as pointed out by Copeland and Wes¬ 
ton (1979). 
On one hand, it is argued that capital structure has no effect 
on the value of the firm (Modigliani and Miller [1958] or Miller 
[1977], and on the other hand, it is suggested that the firm carry 
100% debt (Modigliani and Miller [1963]). 
The confusion does not end here, as further stated by Copeland and 
Weston: 
79 
80 
Neither result is consistent with what seem to be cross- 
section regularities in the observed capital structures of 
U. S. firms. For example, the electric utility and steel 
industries have high financial leverage while service indus¬ 
tries like accounting firms or brokerage houses have almost 
no long-term debt. 
This research adds a new dimension to the literature on cost of 
capital curves. It is interesting to find the empirical data overwhelm¬ 
ingly showing a negatively sloped cost of capital curve for the domestic 
firms taken as a group, but a positively sloped curve for the MNCs in 
the ten-year period considered, which results in the two curves intersect¬ 
ing on superimposition. Since the focus in the earlier part of this study 
is on a comparative positioning of the curves, the issue was accorded addi¬ 
tional empirical treatment. 
From a theoretical standpoint, the curve for the domestics can be 
expected to be placed at a higher level than the MNCs in a cost of capital 
and leverage space. This follows from our extensive coverage of the issue 
earlier. Besides, in researching the issue of segmentation, Stapleton and 
Subrahmanyam (1977) concluded that "In most cases, the effect of segment¬ 
ing capital markets is to depress security prices and also to produce an 
incentive for corporations to increase the diversification opportunities 
available to investors." 
Without doubt, capital market segmentation is still an issue in its 
infancy. If one does believe in the imperfections that abound due to the 
restrictions of various kinds on the flow of capital between nations, one 
can appreciate the greater likelihood of MNCs, with easier access to world 
capital markets, experiencing a higher comparative ratio of earnings to 
price. 
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The first three hypotheses deal with leverage as the independent 
variable, wherein matched samples of the two groups of firms were sub¬ 
jected to regression analysis and the positional differences in the two 
curves noted. The earnings of the group of MNCs were indeed found to 
be higher than the domestic firms at all levels of leverage. Further, 
the MNCs did start out at a lower level of cost of capital as conjectured, 
but after the intersection of the two curves the over-riding cost of 
capital curve emerged for the MNCs. Some other interesting highlights 
on the subject were presented in Chapter IV. 
The second proposition looks at the cost of capital models used 
for fitting the two curves with the intention of testing statistical 
significance of any differences in the regression coefficients. The em¬ 
phasis was on obtaining the regression coefficients of the best-fitting 
curves. 
A great deal of research exists on the extension of the basic capi¬ 
tal asset pricing model to the international setting, even if we concern 
ourselves solely with the implications for cost of capital of multinationals. 
Since the international financial markets have been depicted as ranging 
from highly imperfect in terms of segmentation to largely integrated, the 
real issue in modelling revolves around picking the right variables and 
representing the true market environment. 
In a situation of perfect capital markets, arbitrage opportunities 
available to the investors, individual or institutional, would narrow 
down the gap between cost of equivalent financing around the globe. 
Small differences, although, would still remain as is true for the national 
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markets due to a variety of reasons, such as differences in debt maturi¬ 
ties and default risks, marketability of the security transactions costs, 
etc. Restrictions on capital flows, that effect the truly domestic cor¬ 
porations more than an MNC, do tend to segment the financial markets. 
Even an MNC faces restrictions on inflow of capital due to host country 
policies, and on capital outflow due to home country's balance of pay¬ 
ments difficulties, for example. 
If the government controls were to be somehow reduced, integration 
can be improved with active participation from knowledgable investors 
and specialized financial institutions, unless sophisticated MNCs would 
rather achieve similar results through transfer pricing mechanisms. 
In our research, the two models used do show significant differences 
in their regression coefficients at <<= .05. The cross-sectional analysis 
of proposition #1 was next extended to cover the ten-year period 1973-1982. 
It was found rewarding to go beyond the quadratic form of the independent 
variable in a few cases of the ten-year sample period used. Overall, the 
stability of results tended to hold in this time-series analysis which 
substantiated our claims. 
Moving on to the proposition testing the relationship of cost of 
capital and size, in terms of annual dollar volume of sales, of MNCs; 
an earlier research by Beni shay (1961) covers the period 1954 through 1957. 
Binishay picked 56 companies from the Moody's Industrial Manual and Moody's 
Handbook of widely held company stocks to test for the industrial relation¬ 
ship between each of the seven variables and measured rate of return of 
corporate equities. The variables selected for the empirical analysis 
were 1) the trend in earnings; 2) the trend in the market price of the 
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equity; 3) the dividend payout ratio; 4) the expected stability of the 
future income stream; 5) the expected stability of the equity value; 6) 
the size of the firm and the liquidity of its shares, both represented by 
the market value of the equity; and 7) the debt-equity ratio. He reported 
finding the most consistent and statistically significant result in the 
case of the size of the firm. The market showed a preference for larger 
firms as compared to the smaller ones and an overall negative relationship 
with rate of return was found. 
Banz (1981) preferred to call his results the 'size effect' as briefly 
mentioned earlier. He did, however, further specify that the effect due to 
size was not linear in the market value since only the very small firms 
were appreciably affected, while the difference for the average sized and 
the large firms was insignificantly small. In concluding, Banz cautions 
against a generalized usage of the results since it may well be that size 
could just be a proxy for one or more true unknown factors which happen to 
correlate with size. 
The empirical results obtained in this study point to a significant 
negative correlation between size and cost of capital as well as size and 
leverage. 
The fifth proposition attempts to find a relationship between indu- 
trial diversification of U. S. MNCs, taking the leverage and cost of capi¬ 
tal individually as the dependent variable. Mikhail and Shawky (1979) re¬ 
ported their ongoing work on MNCs where they revealed their intention of 
differentiating MNCs on the basis of their business segmentation and other 
things. No published material is yet available from these authors to shed 
light on tha subject. However, earlier in a comparative framework, Kohers 
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(1971) analysed the financial performance of U. S. MNCs and domestic firms. 
His sample was drawn from the Fortune 500 list of industrials and classi¬ 
fied as an MNC or a domestic firm "depending on their degree of foreign 
involvement, as measured in terms of sales, earnings, assets, employment, 
and production." Using a non-parametric paired comparison test over a 
21-quarter time span, Kohers concluded that in each industry surveyed, 
neither grup consistently out performed the other. But in an overall 
analysis, regardless of the industry wise categorization, an average MNC 
was found to be significantly more profitable than its domestic counter¬ 
part, when judged in terms of net worth or returns. 
Our results indicate that there seems to be a positive relationship 
between cost of capital and a greater industrial diversification. How¬ 
ever, no significant correspondence between leverage and industrial 
diversification is borne out by the empirical results. 
The attempted relationship of the next proposition does not have 
much published material to compare our results with for a theoretically 
insightful discussion. Partly to overcome this deficiency, it was 
earlier decided to take the MNCs individually, after first dealing with 
them as a group. 
The theoretical justification for the relationship of MNCs1 country- 
wise expansion and its degree of leverage can be explained as follows. 
It is safe to assume that the very fact of an MNC operating in various 
countries would lead to a possible reduction in its earnings variability 
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due to what can be termed as the beneficial portfolio effect. Whether 
this benefit trickles down to touch the stockholders is an unsettled 
empirical issue, since they may or may not be in a position to directly 
invest abroad due to the possible barriers. Also uncertain is the ef¬ 
fect on the systematic risk of the MNCs' earnings. But, since in the 
overall analysis, systematic earnings variability forms only a portion 
of bankruptcy risk for a corporation, it would be reasonable to assume 
that MNCs would have a tendency to maintain a greater leverage. Thus the 
greater foreign involvement of a firm would seem to suggest a higher degree 
of leverage and vice-versa. 
The results of the sixth proposition were presented which support 
our hypothesis of a fall in cost of capital and a rise in leverage along 
with the country-wise expansion of MNCs. A recent study by Geyikdagi 
(1981) showed the cost of equity capital of twenty-eight U. S. MNCs 
going up at a slower rate in the 1965-1978 period than their counter¬ 
parts within the U. S. due to possibly better defined relations with 
their host countries and also improved communications. 
The final task of dealing with individual MNCs was made more diffi¬ 
cult with the paucity of relevant data, although this did not come as a 
surprise. It was discovered that MNCs have a tendency of cautiously 
strengthening their ties in a new country through their dealerships and 
franchises before attempting to set up shop. Even after carefully check¬ 
ing out the business environment in a potential country, the MNCs prefer 
to avoid fanfare with a sudden big investment. The most popular strategy 
seems to be that of acquiring a small firm in the same line of business. 
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to create a foothold and then cautiously expanding later. This 
advisable move on the part of the MNC created practical problems in 
trying to test the relationship in our hypothesis since a small gesture 
on the part of the MNC does not significantly register on the related 
variables. 
We begin with the impact of foreign operations on the riskiness 
of a firm. A classic article on the subject is by Shapiro (1978) who 
gathered the available evidence and analysed it in his empirical treat¬ 
ment to suggest that an impact, if any, of the foreign operations on a 
firm's riskiness is to reduce both, actual and perceived, riskiness. He 
further stated that the location of the operations abroad as well as the 
percentage of earnings coming from foreign sources do have a major say 
in the perception of risk. 
Shapiro makes an interesting point that calling an MNC's overseas 
investments as debt or equity does not affect its cost of capital, but 
surely the cash flow from the foreign investments is dependent on the 
form of this investment. He cites Robbins and Stobaugh (1972) in observ¬ 
ing that the total foreign plus U. S. taxes paid by these corporations 
is more, since the U. S. MNCs have a tendency to make greater use of 
equity than that dictated by the governmental regulations. Geyikdagi 
(1981) advocates the possibility of reduction in risk associated with 
MNCs' operations abroad as per his empirical findings covering the 
period 1965-1978. 
The results obtained in our analysis of the final two propositions 
do statistically support the notion of a decreasing cost of capital and 
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rising leverage with expansion in the country-wise operations of an 
MNC, and vice-versa. 
In terms of an overall summarization, this research has studied and 
analysed the hypothesized differences in the cost of capital curves of MNCs 
and U. S. domestic firms, when compared on their degree of leverage, in a 
cross-sectional as well as a time-series framework. The interesting de¬ 
velopment of an intersection of curves added a new dimension to the issue 
and called for insightful theoretical deductions which were borne out by 
actual data in the confirmatory analysis that followed. 
Also explored in depth are the operational aspects of MNCs taken 
exclusively, first as a group when two separate multiple regressions were 
run with cost of capital and leverage taken individually as the dependent 
variable and sales volume, industrial diversification, and country-wise 
expansion representing the independent variables. Later the focus shifted 
to the actual transitional phases of individual MNCs with data obtained 
on before-an-event and after-an-event to note the correspondence with 
leverage and cost of capital. 
As a final word at the commencement of this issue in world trade, 
the international scene can be said to be undergoing changes of such impor¬ 
tance and magnitude that in the future research- work, the time period used 
would possibly be having a major bearing on the conclusions drawn. Also, 
the issues finding agreement among researchers would themselves be suggest¬ 
ing unsettling problems requiring more concentrated efforts in view of the 
then current international environment. Besides, as the financial concepts 
proven over time in a single-country environment gain favor and application 
88 
in the multi-country setting, the domestic concepts themselves may undergo 
revision with or without inputs from the world economic environment. The 
existing lag in the domestic concepts finding their way into the multi¬ 
national scene would be expected to lessen. On a more optimistic note, 
the international enviroment may well lead the way if the winds of change 
continue to blow strong. 
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TABLE 3 
COMPARATIVE REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE 1982 SAMPLE 
Multinational 
Corporations 
U. S. Domestic 
Fi rms 
Number of observations 27 33 
Mean of dependent variable 10.077778 10.732727 
Estimated coefficients — C 
(with T-statisties) DE 
DE**2 
DE**3 
DE**4 
3.867214 (1.35) 
0.677998 (2.44) 
-0.020048(-2.52) 
0.000206 (2.57) 
-0.000001(-2.61) 
13.134954 (9.80) 
-0.036591(-2.16) 
R-squared .2829 .1311 
Corrected R-square .1525 .1031 
F-statistics (4,22)=2.169863 (1 ,31 )=4.678659 
Sum of squared residuals 235.814992 577.512134 
Standard error of the regression 3.273968 4.316182 
90 
TABLE 4 
COMPARATIVE REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE 1981 SAMPLE 
Multinational 
Corporations 
U. S. Domestic 
Fi rms 
Number of observations 36 29 
Mean of dependent variable 12.721389 12.170345 
Estimated coefficients — C 
(with T-statisties) DE 
DE**2 
DE**3 
DE**4 
9.831014 (7.34) 
0.087709 (2.69) 
-0.000377(-2.79) 
15.314588 (9.71) 
—0.049862(-2.28) 
R-squared .1918 .1612 
Corrected R-squared .1428 .1301 
F-statisti cs (2,33)=3.915856 (1 ,27)=5.189256 
Sum of squared residuals 421.868150 456.601018 
Standard error of the regression 3.575456 4.112317 
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TABLE 5 
COMPARATIVE REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE 1980 SAMPLE 
Multinational U. S. Domestic 
Corporations_Firms 
Number of observations 40 31 
Mean of dependent variable 12.971000 13.284839 
Estimated coefficients — C 
(with T-statisties) DE 
DE**2 
DE**3 
DE**4 
10.409090 (6.03) 
0.112598 (2.17) 
-0.000783(-2.64) 
17.202971 (12.63) 
-0.053899 (-3.40) 
R-squared .1733 .2851 
Corrected R-squared .1286 .2605 
F-statisties (2,37)=3.877370 (1 ,29)=1 .6341 
Sum of squared residuals 709.112953 475.790460 
Standard of error of the regression 4.377809 4.050502 
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TABLE 6 
COMPARATIVE REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE 1979 SAMPLE 
Multinational 
Corporations 
U. S. Domestic 
Firms 
Number of observations 33 30 
Mean of dependent variable 14.975758 13.559000 
Estimated coefficients -- C 
(with T-statisties) DE 
DE**2 
DE**3 
DE**4 
5.137968 (2.26) 
0.499972 (4.64) 
-0.005768(-4.54) 
0.000016 (4.42) 
22.921667 (12.40) 
-0.159666 (-4.77) 
0.000378 ( 3.30) 
R-squared .4268 .5574 
Corrected R-squared .3675 .5246 
F-stati sties (3,29)=7.198700 (2,27)=17.002006 
Sum of squared residuals 313.156977 341.208100 
Standard error of the regression 3.286110 3.554903 
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TABLE 7 
COMPARATIVE REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE 1978 SAMPLE 
Number of observations 
Mean of dependent variable 
Estimated coefficients — C 
(with T-stati sties) DE 
DE**2 
DE**3 
DE**4 
R-squared 
Corrected R-squared 
F-statisties 
Sum of squared residuals 
Standard error of the regression 
Multinational 
Corporations 
39 
14.239487 
11.857907 (12.07) 
0.041919 ( 3.05) 
.2013 
.1797 
(1,37)=9.326893 
515.876085 
3.733979 
U. S. Domestic 
Fi rms 
37 
12.730541 
30.422013 (5.92) 
-0.658758(-3.05) 
0.006711 (2.68) 
-0.000020(-2.50) 
.3028 
.2394 
(3,33)=4.777207 
851.135472 
5.078581 
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TABLE 8 
COMPARATIVE REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE 1977 SAMPLE 
Number of observations 
Mean of dependent variable 
Estimated coefficients -- C 
(with T-statisties) DE 
DE**2 
DE**3 
DE**4 
R-squared 
Corrected R-squared 
F-statisties 
Sum of squared residuals 
Standard error of the regression 
Multinational 
Corporations 
28 
13.200357 
15.141801 (15.10) 
-0.030589 (-2.41) 
.1830 
.1515 
(1 ,26)=5.822597 
260.321032 
3.164229 
U. S. Domestic 
Fi rms 
31 
12.883871 
22.441311 (6.05) 
-0.471374(-3.41) 
0.005488 (3.93) 
-0.000014(-4.03) 
.4153 
.3503 
(3,27)=6.391982 
448.790709 
4.076994 
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TABLE 9 
COMPARATIVE REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE 1976 SAMPLE 
Multinational 
Corporations 
U. S. Domestic 
Fi rms 
Number of observations 30 29 
Mean of dependent variable 13.217667 13.137241 
Estimated coefficients — C 
(with T-statisties) DE 
De**2 
DE**3 
DE**4 
7.843209 (4.49) 
0.156123 (3.29) 
-0.000701(-2.95) 
29.120061 (3.89) 
—0.905677(—2.50) 
0.014153 (2.74) 
-0.000062(-2.82) 
R-squared .2896 .2851 
Corrected R-squared .2370 .1993 
F-statisties (2,27)=5.503410 (3,25)=3.323071 
Sum of squared residuals 326.753656 290.450048 
Standard error of the regression 3.478844 3.408519 
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TABLE 10 
COMPARATIVE REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE 1975 SAMPLE 
Multinational 
Corporations 
U. S. Domestic 
Fi rms 
Number of observations 33 30 
Mean of dependent variable 14.667273 15.952333 
Estimated coefficients — C 
(with T-statisties) DE 
DE**2 
DE**3 
DE**4 
7.943681 (3.44) 
0.173739 (3.07) 
-0.000783(-2.69) 
10.253446 (4.65) 
0.173720 (3.13) 
-0.000805(-3.38) 
R-squared .2478 .2976 
Corrected R-squared .1977 .2455 
F-statisties (2,30)=4.941807 (2,27)=5.718500 
Sum of squared residuals 713.590834 572.422564 
Standard error of the regression 4.877126 4.604437 
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TABLE 11 
COMPARATIVE REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE 1974 SAMPLE 
Multinational 
Corporations 
U. S. Domestic 
Fi rms 
Number of observations 31 28 
Mean of dependent variable 18.917742 18.480357 
Estimated coefficients — C 
(with T-statistics) DE 
DE**2 
DE**3 
DE**4 
25.333044 (4.98) 
-0.625017(-1.79) 
0.013272 (1.80) 
-0.000091(-1.59) 
0.000000 (1.37) 
23.082076 (5.09) 
-0.436546(-1.61 ) 
0.009680 (1.97) 
-0.000074(-2.21 ) 
0.000000 (2.35) 
R-squared .2319 .2693 
Corrected R-squared .1137 .1422 
F-statisties (4,26)=1 .962457 (4,23)=2.119295 
Sum of squared residuals 929.059218 647.432552 
Standard error of the regression 5.977713 5.305586 
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TABLE 12 
COMPARATIVE REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE 1973 SAMPLE 
Multinational U. S. Domestic 
Corporations_F i rms 
Number of observations 
Mean of dependent variable 
Estimated coefficients -- C 
(with T-statistics) DE 
DE**2 
DE**3 
DE**4 
R-squared 
Corrected R-squared 
F-statistics 
Sum of squared residuals 
Standard error of the regression 
37 
11.490000 
8.436230 (7.08) 
0.055177 (2.99) 
.2033 
.1806 
(1 ,35)=8.932098 
489.143108 
3.738384 
29 
11.338276 
8.662294 (6.57) 
0.047788 (2.42) 
.1779 
.1475 
(1,27)=5.844278 
400.576360 
3.851774 
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TABLE 13 
MULTIPLE REGRESSION RESULTS—CROSS-SECTIONAL SAMPLE 
WITH COST OF CAPITAL AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
1981-MNCs 
Variables: 
COPM cost of capital 
C vertical intercept 
SLG2M square of log of sales 
SLLGM log of sales 
INDM # of industries the MNCs are operating in 
COUNM # of countries the MNCs have operations in 
Mean of dependent variable is 12.582000 
Right-hand 
Variable 
C 
SLG2M 
SLLGM 
INDM 
COUNM 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
320.958888 
1.606840 
-44.492964 
.973920 
-1.559191 
Standard 
Error 
105.449363 
.541710 
15.131539 
.303378 
.624395 
T- 
Statisties 
3.043725 
2.966235 
-2.940412 
3.210248 
-2.497124 
R-squared = .3312 Corrected R-squared = .2420 
F-statistics (4.,30.)=3.713581 
Number of observations = 35. 
Sum of squared residuals = 334.980117 
Standard error of the regression = 3.341557 
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TABLE 14 
MULTIPLE REGRESSION RESULTS—CROSS-SECTIONAL SAMPLE 
WITH LEVERAGE AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
1981-MNCs 
Variables: 
DELGM debt-equity ratio 
C vertical intercept 
SLLGM log of sales 
SLG2M square of log sales 
INDM # of industries the MNCs are operating in 
IND2M square of # of industries the MNCs are operating in 
COUNM # of countries the MNCs have operations in 
C0UN2M square of the # of countries the MNCs have operations in 
Mean of dependent variable is 3.775901 
Right-hand Estimated Standard T- 
Variable Coefficient Error Statistics 
C 56.455294 14.997255 3.764375 
SLLGM -7.997627 2.158430 -3.705299 
SLG2M .286293 .077838 3.678053 
INDM -.068010 .121822 -.558274 
IND2M .014376 .013949 1.030612 
COUNM 1.832917 .515323 3.556831 
C0UN2M -.263246 .072690 -3.621470 
R-squared = .6039 Corrected R- squared = .4959 
F-statisties (6.,22.) = 5.590240 
Number of observations = 29. 
Sum of sqbared residuals = 2.975307 
Standard error of the regression = .367752 
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TABLE 15 
YEAR 
DATA FOR S&P 400's USED AS INDEX 
AVERAGE PRICE* EARNINGS/PRICE 
1960 $ 59.095 5.74% 
61 72.06 4.68 
62 65.35 5.92 
63 74.48 5.69 
64 86.745 5.57 
65 93.795 5.87 
66 88.58 6.65 
67 100.91 5.61 
68 105.61 5.82 
69 106.2 5.81 
70 90.395 6.01 
71 110.745 5.44 
72 125.565 5.44 
73 117.07 7.57 
74 88.045 11.01 
75 100.2 8.53 
76 117.56 9.08 
77 107.715 10.74 
78 105.87 12.39 
79 117.35 13.81 
80 134.88 11.96 
81 142.115 
★★★★ *★★★ ★★★★ 
11.65 
Source: Standard & Poor's Statistical Servi ce—Security Price Index 
Record, 1982 Edition. 
* (Hi + Lo)/2 of quarterly figures 
** E-P ratios shown are obtained by dividing the stock price index, as 
of the end of the period, by the 4 qr. total of earnings through the 
corresponding quarter, and taking the inverse. 
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TABLE 16 
FIRST ENTRY INTO A COUNTRY 
BEFORE YEAR OF CHANGE AFTER 
Firm & Year of Change EPS/PPS D/E EPS/PPS D/E EPS/PPS D/E 
AAR Corp. (in 1970) 3.51% 34.50% 2.59% 30.86% 2.51% 45.20% 
AAR Corp. (in 1969) 0.69 29.28 3.51 34.50 2.59 30.86 
Aeronca, Inc. (in 1969) 6.43 122.39 5.16 118.65 10.24 81.20 
Augat, Inc. (in 1973) 2.59 0.00 3.68 6.33 6.55 4.73 
Avnet, Inc. (in 1971) 4.72 69.50 7.54 51.23 8.89 41.56 
Data Terminal Systems 
(in 1979) 4.24 6.01 7.17 4.49 7.20 63.77 
Data Terminal Systems 
(in 1978) 3.06 1.98 4.24 6.01 7.17 4.49 
Champion International 
Corporation (in 1974) 14.16 95.92 21.41 104.46 12.95 103.21 
Champion International 
Corporation (in 1967) 8.81 72.48 5.59 61.35 5.85 64.30 
Binney & Smith, Inc. 
(in 1980) 7.04 1.12 7.75 11.12 10.45 9.28 
Bandag, Inc. (in 1978) 9.97 8.93 12.03 10.67 12.53 9.27 
Berkey Photo, Inc. 
(in 1967) 6.13 56.95 2.93 39.47 3.02 21.40 
ACF Industries, Inc. 
(in 1974) 9.42 86.78 11.27 94.74 13.21 91.57 
The Clorox Co. (in 1978) 11.08 22.43 12.48 23.00 - 14.04 18.12 
CTS Corp. (in 1970) 6.72 0.00 8.69 0.00 7.19 0.00 
The Boeing Co. (in 1964) 7.65 41.66 10.47 35.80 11.60 26.44 
Carpenter Technology 
Corporation (in 1970) 7.51 11.48 10.79 9.12 4.68 21.70 
Crompton & Knowles 
(in 1968) 6.37 11.92 7.08 23.53 8.37 21.54 
Crown Central Petro 
(in 1974) 28.68 72.38 30.86 60.80 18.06 72.86 
Culbro Corp. (in 1967) 7.98 80.84 8.85 91.98 9.17 83.88 
Curtis Burns, Inc. 
(in 1976) 25.07 60.82 21.38 44.48 20.78 75.86 
Damon Corp. (in 1972) 2.04 30.09 1.88 19.44 3.16 45.76 
Centronics Data Comp. 
(in 1975) 10.48 0.00 9.65 0.00 7.30 0.00 
Cetec Corp. (in 1975) 14.58 54.65 11.46 48.55 12.50 42.82 
Chomerics Corp. (in 1972) i 2.43 21.41 5.45 16.30 7.00 12.89 
Chrysler Corp. (in 1963) 12.73 30.86 12.85 27.78 10.76 21.61 
Cincinnati Milacron 
tin 1971) 5.17 26.37 0.78 25.75 1.17 40.90 
Commercial Metals (in 1965) 29.16 42.93 21.72 37.51 21.55 23.68 
Conrac Corp. (in 1969) 1.92 44.30 2.92 67.33 5.18 54.60 
Core Laboratories(in 19^)15.43 8.65 5.68 7.37 8.08 55.89 
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TABLE 17 
TOTAL WITHDRAWAL FROM A COUNTRY 
BEFORE YEAR OF CHANGE AFTER 
Firm & Year of Change EPS/PPS D/E EPS/PPS D/E EPS/PPS D/E 
Avent, Inc. (in 1972) 7.54% 51.23% 8.89% 41.56% 8.05% 54.94% 
Champion International 
Corporation (in 1977) 13.07 80.18 12.23 60.10 15.44 64.99 
Binney & Smith, Inc. 
(in 1975) 11.10 15.21 23.80 18.88 15.46 22.25 
The Clorox Co. (in 1979) 12.48 23.00 14.04 18.12 14.66 16.09 
The Boeing Co. (in 1978) 17.39 8.46 14.99 6.21 20.73 4.37 
Carpenter Technology 
Corporation (in 1980) 15.77 2.99 12.69 1.15 11.73 1.02 
Cetec Corp. (in 1980) 13.63 58.02 11.52 26.99 8.59 22.96 
Koppers Company, Inc. 
(in 1972) 9.99 50.99 11.04 57.04 13.59 49.32 
Martin Marietta Corp. 
(in 1973) 10.72 64.23 28.00 63.32 22.38 48.63 
National Distellers & 
Chemical Co. (in 1980) 16.44 31.93 10.69 26.65 15.16 23.38 
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TABLE 18 
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS—1982 SAMPLE 
Name of Firm EPS/PPS Debt/Equity 
Allied Stores Corp. 14.14 91.09 
American Broadcasting Cos. 12.59 33.07 
Amstar Corp. 15.96 19.27 
Associated Dry Goods Corp. 9.14 58.20 
Brown Group Inc. 12.65 17.65 
Capital Cities Comm. Inc. 7.21 5.67 
Diebold Inc. 7.97 7.47 
Equifax Inc. 9.12 8.73 
Gannett Co. Inc. 7.10 30.16 
General Host Corp. 10.06 88.93 
Southdown, Inc. 11.97 34.30 
American Petrofina Inc. 9.59 17.80 
Anchor Hocking Corp. 7.54 35.15 
The Cessna Aircraft Co. 4.82 8.37 
Champion International Corp. 2.46 73.13 
Conagra Inc. 10.85 67.14 
DWG Corp. 44.24 120.90 
Eagle Picher Inc., Inc. 9.31 32.28 
Essex Chemical Corp. 10.32 156.54 
Acme Cleveland Corp. 12.68 32.91 
The Boeing Co. 11.96 11.20 
Insilco Corp. 5.29 36.72 
Kaneb Services, Inc. 15.47 112.31 
Pacific Resources, Inc. 6.63 175.71 
Quaker State Oil Refininq 13.29 30.87 
Abbott Laboratories 7.11 14.56 
ACF Industries Inc. 8.04 115.80 
Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. 18.34 56.57 
Albany International CorpT" 8.46 30.86 
Alco Standard Corp. 11.95 51.61 
ATTiid Corp" 16.78 34.77 
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TABLE 19 
U. S. DOMESTIC FIRMS—1982 SAMPLE' 
Name of Firm EPS/PPS Debt/Eguity 
American Stores Co. 16.94 74.03 
Amfac, Inc. 9.90 82.58 
Armstrong Rubber Co. 15.59 60.21 
Beverly Enterprises 4.40 217.86 
Brockway Glass Co. 13.44 36.85 
Browning Ferris Industries Inc. 7.77 36.50 
Dayton-Hudson Corp. 9.39 46.80 
Dean Foods Co. 11.91 34.97 
Dorchester Gas Corp. 6.85 111.47 
Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates 15.16 74.55 
Fabri-Centers of America 11.58 30.75 
First Mississippi Corp. 7.36 41.60 
Flowers Industries Inc. 10.46 56.32 
General Cinema Corp. 10.49 167.45 
Gordon Jewelry Corp. 15.46 35.74 
W. W. Grainger, Inc. 7.79 7.08 
Hammermill Paper Co. 12.95 88.32 
Harte-Hanks Communications 8.72 71.14 
Kaiser Steel Corp. 0.92 84.47 
Lucky Stores, Inc. 11.70 48.74 
Media General Inc. 10.90 23.49 
MGM Grand Hotels Inc. 8.27 129.62 
The Mohawk Rubber Co. 20.26 22.12 
G. C. Murphy Co. 18.93 53.44 
Pargas Inc. 14.18 33.72 
Potlatch Corp. 3.05 78.38 
Stone Container Corp. 7.94 97.51 
Super Valu Stores Inc. 8.48 19.66 
Texas Oil & Gas Corp. 9.13 75.04 
Ti Caro Inc. 13.81 21.09 
Tultex Corp. 18.21 55.88 
Tyler Corp. 6.04 119.78 
Westmoreland Coal Company 6.20 29.38 
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TABLE 20 
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS—1981 SAMPLE 
Name of Firm 
Sales 
(in '000s) 
Number of 
Countries EPS/PPS D/E 
# of In¬ 
dustries 
Allied Stores Corp. 2,760,867 2 17.17 75.81 1 
American Broadcasting Cos. 2,443,713 2 16.12 23.78 2 
Amstar Corp. 1,980,375 2 31.84 22.22 2 
Associated Dry Goods Corp. 2,750,1 31 2 15.16 53.23 1 
Brown Group Inc. 1,337,779 2 20.76 21.20 5 
Capital Cities Comm. Inc. 573,784 2 8.93 24.41 2 
Certain-Teed Corp. 891 ,532 2 H 84.37 3 
Diebold Inc. 385,891 2 8.39 10.64 2 
Equifax Inc. 401,785 2 20.10 11.09 1 
Gannett Co. Inc. 1,367,171 2 8.81 26.49 1 
General Host Corp. 499,808 2 28.42 156.28 1 
Greif Bros. Corp. 318,800 2 7.08 2.86 4 
Southdown, Inc. 270,691 2 14.09 32.15 2 
American Petrofina Inc. 2,522,154 3 12.19 14.43 1 
Anchor Hocking Corp. 953,421 3 16.45 28.70 7 
The Cessna Aircraft Co. 1 ,089,185 3 11.89 8.42 1 
Champion International Corp, . 4,004,027 3 6.63 67.25 1 
Cleveland Cliff Iron Co. 412,472 3 9.34 9.59 5 
Conagra Inc. 1,382,001 3 11.26 79.50 4 
DWG Corp. 266,826 3 20.39 98.02 4 
Eagle Picher Ind., Inc. 624,208 3 10.41 40.29 4 
Essex Chemical Corp. 176,403 3 16.65 95.12 1 
Galveston Houston Co. 221,713 3 12.35 89.90 1 
Acme Cleveland Corp. 404,250 4 8.99 48.10 1 
Athlone Industries, Inc. 323,646 4 20.09 124.47 3 
The Boeing Co. 10,072,600 4 14.79 12.32 1 
Copperweld Corp. 618,454 4 18.27 30.43 2 
Inland Steel Co. 3,754,941 4 9.23' 59.16 6 
Insilco Corp. 692,275 4 12.22 39.02 7 
NVF Co. 1,034,024 4 6.34 264.55 4 
Pacific Resources, Inc. 1,081,477 4 9.91 171,22 3 
Quaker State Oil Refininq 929,258 4 7.66 41.00 3 
Tyco Laboratories Inc. 369,542 4 30.69 54.66 2 
Abbott Laboratories 2,342,524 5 7.58 17.76 1 
ACF Industries Inc. 948,346 5 12.18 93.87 7 
Air Products & Chemicals Inc 1 ,935,387 5 17.22 155.23 7 
The Allen Group Inc. 362,873 5 10.56 45.41 4 
Allied Corp. 6,407,000 5 18.55 45.10 6 
Aluminum Co. of America 4,977,500 5 13.20 47.15 5 
Arnerace Corp. 319,998 5 13.23 51.01 6 
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TABLE 21 
U. S. DOMESTIC FIRMS—1981 SAMPLE 
Sales # of In- 
Name of Firm (in ’000s) EPS/PPS D/E dustries 
American Stores Co. 7,116,978 21.47 94.02 1 
Amfac, Inc. 2,148,008 11.98 82.32 7 
Armstrong Rubber Co. 560,458 29.79 73.28 1 
Beverly Enterprises 486,156 7.76 149.07 1 
Browning Ferris Industries Inc. 660,670 8.20 49.97 1 
Caesars World Inc. 625,601 12.51 85.87 1 
Circle K Corp. 644,457 10.47 90.51 2- 
Dayton-Hudson Corp. 4,942,859 14.09 35.91 4 
Dean Foods Co. 728,643 12.79 44.26 1 
Dorchester Gas Corp. 712,033 7.56 90.95 1 
Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates 1 ,157,453 10.60 65.25 2 
Fabri-Centers of America 172,777 15.82 18.29 1 
First Mississippi Corp. 357,697 6.84 38.39 4 
Flowers Industries Inc. 392,613 14.47 57.38 1 
General Cinema Corp. 823,551 12.18 76.74 5 
Gordon Jewelry Corp. 481,534 20.76 47.06 1 
W. W. Grainger, Inc. 868,018 10.14 04.29 1 
Hammermill Paper Co. 1,403,206 22.16 77.78 1 
Harte-Hanks Communications 348,519 7.51 71.56 2 
Kaiser Steel Corp. 1,104,416 D 100.76 2 
Lucky Stores, Inc. 7,201,404 12.75 49.86 1 
Marshall Field & Co. 1,193,961 10.94 26.73 1 
Media General Inc. 366,544 13.02 15.34 3 
MGM Grand Hotels Inc. 169,766 8.18 126.86 2 
The Mohawk Rubber Co. 212,523 23.63 29.33 2 
G. C. Murphy Co. 820,658 6.82 55.55 2 
Pargas Inc. 281,215 19.01 42.29 2 
Potlatch Corp. 880,493 8.39 77.87 2 
Russell Corp. 270,426 15.08 24.88 3 
Stone Container Corp. 413,303 14.58 84.37 2 
Super Valu Stores Inc. 4,622,444 9.57 25.19 2 
Texas Oil & Gas Corp. 1,610,523 5.76 83.32 1 
Ti Caro Inc. 271,840 21.15 17.51 1 
Tultex Corp. 191 ,975 21.36 51.49 1 
Tyler Corp. 770,889 12.79 14.39 2 
Westmoreland Coal Company 480,291 (-) 00.50 1 
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TABLE 22 
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS—1980 SAMPLE 
Name of Firm_EPS/PPS_Debt/Equity 
Allied Stores Corp. 18.68 61.68 
American Broadcasting Cos. 16.03 27.11 
Amstar Corp. 14.28 29.40 
Associated Dry Goods Corp. 16.78 28.57 
Brown Group Inc. 21.24 26.37 
Capital Cities Comm. Inc. 9.93 10.73 
Diebold Inc. 8.74 14.19 
Equifax Inc. 15.46 14.01 
Gannett Co. Inc. 11.59 21.92 
General Host Corp. 0.84 194.72 
Greif Bros. Corp. 5.83 7.02 
Southdown, Inc. 13.08 50.38 
American Petrofina Inc. 19.31 20.05 
Anchor Hocking Corp. 16.11 29.87 
The Cessna Aircraft Co. 7.34 12.94 
Champion International Corp. 10.84 60.34 
Cleveland Cliff Iron Co. 13.03 8.38 
Conagra Inc. 10.20 70.21 
DWG Corp. 21.45 112.18 
Eagle Picher Inc., Inc. 11.26 39.33 
Essex Chemical Corp. 14.47 111.01 
Galveston Houston Co. 6.21 57.51 
Acme Cleveland Corp. 14.56 65.86 
Athlone Industries, Inc. 14.65 126.55 
Copperweld Corp. 15.86 34.77 
Inland Steel Co. 4.65 62.07 
Insilco Corp. 13.97 35.56 
NVF Co. • 2.42 263.50 
Pacific Resources, Inc. 11.98 123.71 
Quaker State Oil Refining 6.95 42.45 
Tyco Laboratories Inc. 18.46 64.02 
Abbott Laboratories 7.59 18.20 
ACF Industries Inc. 12.91 97.32 
Air Products & Chemicals Inc. 9.41 59.54 
Albany International Corp. 12.16 20.47 
Alco Standard Corp. 16.56 56.52 
Allegheny International Inc. 11.57 81.06 
The Allen Group Inc. 12.54 39.28 
Allied Corp. 16.18 53.19 
Aluminum Co. of America 20.32 37.78 
Arnerace Corp. 15.82 56.15 
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TABLE 23 
U. S. DOMESTIC FIRMS—1980 SAMPLE 
Name of Firm EPS/PPS Debt/Equity 
American Stores Co. 16.19 108.38 
Amfac, Inc. 18.56 77.12 
Beverly Enterprises 8.44 211.43 
Browning Ferris Industries Inc. 9.22 81.39 
Caesars World Inc. 6.92 136.85 
Circle K Corp. 14.49 73.04 
Dayton-Hudson Corp. 13.61 29.77 
Dean Foods Co. 15.84 57.23 
Dorchester Gas Corp. 9.58 67.06 
Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates 10.10 53.68 
Fabri-Centers of America 20.92 45.42 
First Mississippi Corp. 4.95 49.97 
Flowers Industries Inc. 13.89 49.84 
General Cinema Corp. 12.99 92.12 
Gordon Jewelry Corp. 19.12 54.73 
W. W. Grainger, Inc. 10.57 1.58 
Hammermill Paper Co. 19.20 54.49 
Harte-Hanks Communications 8.71 72.53 
Kaiser Steel Corp. 71.81 41.02 
Lucky Stores, Inc. 11.43 58.28 
Marshall Field & Co. 11.14 30.01 
Media General Inc. 14.12 15.13 
MGM Grand Hotels Inc. 8.56 86.85 
The Mohawk Rubber Co. 24.74 52.42 
G. C. Murphy Co. 16.20 58.81 
Pargas Inc. 14.36 54.68 
Potlatch Corp. 8.68 64.26 
Russell Corp. 19.84 29.61 
Stone Container Corp. 18.81 60.69 
Super Valu Stores Inc. 11.21 29.65 
Texas American Energy Corp. 5.89 220.00 
Texas Oil & Gas Corp. 5.37 88.68 
Ti Caro Inc. 22.00 20.86 
Tultex Corp. 24.05 77.43 
Tyler Corp. 17.41 64.61 
Valero Energy Corp. 9.03 106.31 
Westmoreland Coal Company 0.25 22.43 
i 
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TABLE 24 
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS—1979 SAMPLE 
Name of Firm EPS/PPS Debt/Equity 
Allied Stores Corp. 18.23 54.06 
American Broadcasting Cos. 14.17 29.99 
Amstar Corp. 12.28 32.26 
Associated Dry Goods Corp. 17.28 32.03 
Brown Group Inc. 22.20 30.75 
Capital Cities Comm. Inc. 10.80 18.88 
Certain-Teed Corp. 7.87 70.07 
Diebold Inc. 12.29 18.41 
Equifax Inc. 14.25 16.89 
Gannett Co., Inc. 9.03 18.47 
General Host Corp. 76.77 108.33 
Greif Bros. Corp. 9.17 10.46 
Southdown, Inc. 19.19 88.36 
American Petrofina Inc. 24.09 28.04 
Anchor Hocking Corp. 17.53 31.27 
The Cessna Aircraft Co. 12-. 46 14.76 
Champion International Corp. 19.13 54.54 
Cleveland Cliff Iron Co. 12.13 9.41 
Conagra Inc. 20.70 55.59 
DWG Corp. 13.50 76.18 
Eagle Picher Ind., Inc. 13.68 29.28 
Essex Chemical Corp. 16.58 120.02 
Galveston Houston Co. 5.86 85.08 
Acme Cleveland Corp. 19.18 45.90 
Athlone Industries, Inc. 5.88 122.22 
Copperweld Corp. 21.98 36.22 
Inland Steel Co. 18.01 48.35 
Insilco Corp. 17.92 37.01 
NVF Co. 16.81 233.22 
Pacific Resources, Inc. 9.90 102.02 
Quaker State Oil Refining 8.78 45.84 
Tyco Laboratories Inc. 25.10 112.00 
Abbott Laboratories 8.08 23.35 
ACF Industries, Inc. 15.80 89.25 
Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. 11.31 48.17 
Alco Standard Corp. 16.87 56.25 
Allegheny International Inc. 32.67 77.05 
The Allen Group, Inc. 16.68 47.69 
Allied Corp. 0.51 77.53 
Aluminum Co. of America 26.79 44.55 
Amerace Corp. 18.38 58.58 
Albany International Corp. 12.80 25.11 
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TABLE 25 
U. S. DOMESTIC FIRMS—1979 SAMPLE 
Name of Firm EPS/PPS Debt/Equity 
American Stores Co. 15.03 121.53 
Amfac, Inc. 19.92 97.94 
Armstrong Rubber Co. 20.62 81.95 
Beverly Enterprises 9.95 297.46 
Browning Ferris Industries, Inc. 11.45 84.95 
Caesars World, Inc. 1.72 152.78 
Circle K Corp. 10.72 112.59 
Dayton-Hudson Corp. 20.18 19.83 
Dean Foods Co. 16.09 35.39 
Dorchester Gas Corp. 11.84 90.40 
Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates 11.64 61.89 
Fabri-Centers of America 17.77 32.77 
First Mississippi Corp. 2.79 62.65 
Flowers Industries, Inc. 13.83 49.28 
General Cinema Corp. 10.86 101.98 
Gordon Jewelry Corp. 21.89 41.73 
W. W. Grainger, Inc. 9.72 1.96 
Harte-Hanks Comnunications 8.67 105.59 
Kaiser Steel Corp. 20.35 67.17 
Lucky Stores, Inc. 12.61 42.33 
Marshall Field & Co. 8.89 28.29 
Media General, Inc. 14.55 15.42 
MGM Grand Hotels, Inc. 5.06 113.49 
The Mohawk Rubber Co. 12.75 79.53 
G. C. Murphy Co. 17.18 62.89 
Outlet Co. 5.78 176.55 
Pargas, Inc. 19.78 69.29 
Potlatch Corp. 13.79 62.79 
Russell Corp. 20.85 35.17 
Stone Container Corp. 14.81 72.12 
Super Valu Stores, Inc. 12.67 37.53 
Texas American Energy Corp. 8.19 97.04 
Texas Oil & Gas Corp. 9.23 98.73 
Ti Caro, Inc. 23.08 22.71 
Tultex Corp. 33.17 69.78 
Tyler Corp. 14.45 90.19 
Westmoreland Coal Company 0.85 48.81 
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TABLE 26 
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS—1978 SAMPLE 
name i i i i m 
Allied Stores Corp. 17.28 
ueDt/tquity 
74.09 
Amcord, Inc. 19.70 63.51 
American Broadcastinq Cos. 14.96 32.17 
Amstar Corp. 8.58 34.97 
Associated Dry Goods Corp. 12.36 33.98 
Brown Group, Inc. 17.81 28.67 
Capital Cities Comm., Inc. 8.97 29.28 
Certain-Teed Corp. 14.81 63.40 
Diebold, Inc. 9.42 24.25 
Equifax, Inc. 11.78 8.46 
Gannett Co., Inc. 7.30 25.31 
Greif Bros. Corp. 15.33 13.52 
Southdown, Inc. 19.11 191.38 
American Petrofina, Inc. 11.40 34.64 
Anchor Hocking Corp. 18.70 32.59 
The Cessna Aircraft Co. 10.50 18.74 
Champion International Corp. 15.44 64.99 
Conaqra, Inc. 18.37 62.68 
DWG Corp. 18.93 59.13 
Eaqle Picher Ind., Inc. 13.30 31.35 
Essex Chemical Corp. 16.25 324.45 
Galveston Houston Co. 13.02 47.34 
Acme Cleveland Corp. 16.61 51.33 
Athlone Industries, Inc. 24.35 93.54 
The Boeing Co. 14.97 6.21 
Copperweld Corp. 10.32 41.26 
Inland Steel Co. 20.19 52.14 
Insilco Corp. 15.16 27.94 
Kaneb Services, Inc. 11.71 143.55 
NVF Co. 30.08 39.78 
Pacific Resources, Inc. 13.91 115.66 
Quaker State Oil Refining 9.10 46.05 
Tyco Laboratories, Inc. 21.62 208.00 
Abbott Laboratories 7.07 23.98 
ACF Industries, Inc. 13.78 92.05 
Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. 9.75 43.31 
Albany International Corp. 12.68 25.91 
Alco Standard Corp. 17.06 58.81 
Allegheny International, Inc. 12.26 83.15 
The Allen Group, Inc. 15.99 68.68 
Allied Corp. 11.74 61.71 
Aluminum Co. of America 19.45 58.43 
Arnerace Corp. 17.87 65.10 
Koppers Company 13.88 46.82 
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TABLE 27 
U. S. DOMESTIC FIRMS—' 1978 SAMPLE 
Name of Firm EPS/PPS Debt/Equity 
Alabama By-products Corporation 9.07 84.54 
American Stores Co. 12.30 50.26 
Amfac, Inc. 18.69 104.75 
Armstrong Rubber Co. 19.87 87.16 
Beverly Enterprises 15.18 326.45 
Bluebird, Inc. 15.27 45.31 
Brockway Glass Co. 11 .40 40.02 
Browning Ferris Industries Inc. 10.37 82.15 
Caesars World, Inc. 6.56 200.21 
Circle K Corp. 10.55 103.00 
Dayton-Hudson Corp. 28.95 25.74 
Dean Foods Co. 13.66 46.80 
Dorchester Gas Corp. 13.75 96.62 
Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates 3.67 71.03 
Fabri-Centers of America 18.29 35.03 
First Mississippi Corp. 4.05 73.13 
Flowers Industries, Inc. 12.19 68.80 
General Cinema Corp. 12.10 117.77 
General Portland, Inc. 19.67 48.35 
Hammermill Paper Co. 15.53 69.32 
Harte-Hanks Communications 8.00 75.11 
Kaiser Steel Corp. 4.56 77.46 
Lucky Stores, Inc. 10.92 53.44 
Marshall Field & Co. 8.75 25.13 
McDonough Co. 21.23 12.60 
Media General, Inc. 12.84 19.15 
Munsingwear, Inc~ 12.39 54.68 
G, C. Murphy Co. 0.26 63.69 
Outlet Co. 14.15 126.19 
Pargas, Inc. 7.83 84.71 
Potlatch Corp. 13.49 44.91 
Russell Corp. 16.97 29.92 
Skaggs Cos., Inc. 12.28 50.26 
Stone Container Corp. 10.19 80.18 
Super Valu Stores, Inc. 11.50 30.51 
Texas American Energy Corp. 11.37 105.21 
Texas Oil & Gas Corp. 12.84 113.17 
Ti Caro, Inc. 25.51 26.69 
Tultex Corp. 28.80 83.79 
Tyler Corp. 14.57 55.86 
Westmoreland Coal Company 0.61 27.34 
Wetterau, Inc. 12.44 33.07 
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TABLE 28 
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS—1977 SAMPLE 
Name of Firm EPS/PPS Debt/Equity 
Allied Stores Corp. 13.59 66.47 
Amcord, Inc. 17.08 71.17 
American Broadcasting Cos. 14.52 41.94 
Amstar Corp. 13.71 31.84 
Associated Dry Goods Corp. 11.15 27.52 
Brown Group, Inc. 17.25 32.98 
Capital Cities Comm., Inc. 11.89 42.35 
Certain-Teed Corp. 15.37 71.32 
Diebold, Inc. 7.06 27.24 
Gannett Co., Inc. 7.11 12.94 
Greif Bros. Corp. 19.60 13.69 
Southdown, Inc. 6.10 218.57 
American Petrofina, Inc. 10.58 48.10 
Anchor Hocking Corp. 15.28 38.12 
The Cessna Aircraft Co. 14.67 23.99 
Champion International Corp. 12.23 60.10 
Conagra, Inc. 20.43 71.53 
DWG Corp. 16.52 44.36 
Eagle Picher Ind., Inc. 12.93 37.95 
Essex Chemical Corp. 18.59 26.89 
Galveston Houston Co. 16.26 79.63 
Acme Cleveland Corp. 9.24 51.54 
Athlone Industries, Inc. 18.97 96.97 
The Boeing Co. 17.28 8.46 
Copperweld Corp. 13.45 43.39 
Inland Steel Co. 9.92 53.75 
Insilco Corp. 22.23 30.63 
Kaneb Services, Inc. 8.22 160.42 
NVF Co. 15.28 41.38 
Pacific Resources, Inc. 12.04 128.83 
Quaker State Oil Refining 8.60 46.41 
Tyco Laboratories, Inc. 10.84 155.10 
Abbott Laboratories 8.05 27.58 
ACF Industries, Inc. 11.41 134.74 
Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. 8.47 59.11 
Albany International Corp. 17.46 31.18 
Alco Standard Corp. 21.23 55.91 
Allegheny International, Inc. 12.08 86.01 
The Allen Group, Inc. 15.10 76.09 
Allied Corp. 10.69 69.29 
Aluminum Co. of America 11.16 68.95 
Arnerace Corp. 16.00 71.32 
Koppers Company 11.38 33.60 
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TABLE 29 
U. S. DOMESTIC FIRMS- -1977 SAMPLE 
Name of Firm EPS/PPS Debt/Equity 
Alabama By-products Corporation 11.49 90.99 
American Stores Co. 11.16 56.62 
Amfac, Inc. 7.39 124.57 
Armstrong Rubber Co. 29.30 92.94 
Bluebird, Inc. 17.57 33.17 
Brockway Glass Co. 13.10 42.15 
Browning Ferris Industries, Inc. 11.24 66.61 
Caesars World, Inc. 13.64 267.92 
Circle K Corp. 10.32 32.22 
Dayton-Hudson Corp. 11.33 54.51 
Dean Foods Co. 15.66 31.94 
Dorchester Gas Corp. 9.52 34.21 
Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates 6.60 57.04 
Fabri-Centers of America 11.41 42.27 
First Mississippi Corp. 13.29 84.09 
Flowers Industries, Inc. 9.47 80.28 
General Cinema Corp. 13.70 83.12 
General Portland, Inc. 13.01 31.86 
Hammermill Paper Co. 12.02 72.64 
Harte-Hanks Communications 9.25 34.16 
Kaiser Steel Corp. 1.92 58.03 
Lucky Stores, Inc. 9.68 53.07 
Marshall Field & Co. 6.95 15.19 
McDonough Co. 19.96 16.36 
Media General, Inc. 10.87 25.61 
The Mohawk Rubber Co. 18.64 112.59 
Munsingwear, Inc. 17.19 45.86 
G. C. Murphy Co. 11.45 59.11 
Outlet Co. 29.11 152.91 
Pargas, Inc. 9.84 64.26 
Potlatch Corp. 12.44 49.19 
Russell Corp. 22.34 33.10 
Skaggs Cos., Inc. 11.16 56.62 
Stone Container Corp. 15.23 72.62 
Super Valu Stores, Inc. 12.20 22.65 
Texas American Energy Corp. 13.66 104.29 
Texas Oil & Gas Corp. 11.27 86.32 
Ti Caro, Inc. 32.67 32.91 
Tultex Corp. 55.65 83.92 
Tyler Corp. 16.35 37.10 
Westmoreland Coal Company 5.70 12.71 
Wetterau, Inc. 9.10 36.57 
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TABLE 30 
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS- -1976 SAMPLE 
Name of Firm EPS/PPS Debt/Equity 
Allied Stores Corp. 13.60 66.47 
Amcord, Inc. 17.34 87.79 
American Broadcasting Cos. 13.45 50.31 
Amstar Corp. 22.91 35.85 
Associated Dry Goods Corp. 8.92 21.23 
Brown Group, Inc. 12.89 39.51 
Capital Cities Comm., Inc. 9.33 20.69 
Certain-Teed Corp. 13.52 66.14 
Diebold, Inc. 10.00 30.21 
Gannett Co., Inc. 6.06 5.16 
Greif Bros. Corp. 29.32 15.96 
Kane-Miller Corp. 16.62 95.66 
American Petrofina, Inc. 11.62 28.32 
Anchor Hocking Corp. 14.59 37.95 
The Cessna Aircraft Co. 13.97 33.51 
Champion International Corp. 12.22 71.67 
Conagra, Inc. 49.02 87.44 
DWG Corp. 24.64 54.75 
Eagle Picher Ind., Inc. 13.52 36.35 
Essex Chemical Corp. 20.09 41.92 
Galveston Houston Co. 18.76 116.87 
Acme Cleveland Corp. 7.07 48.96 
Athlone Industries, Inc. 21.32 102.22 
The Boeing Co. 13.81 10.85 
Copperweld Corp. 15.11 42.59 
Inland Steel Co. 10.44 43.66 
Insilco Corp. 17.03 23.41 
Kaneb Services, Inc. 4.72 91.61 
NVF Co. 13.89 37.29 
Pacific Resources, Inc. 30.89 143.66 
Quaker State Oil Refining 8.17 47.08 
Tyco Laboratories, Inc. 9.36 205.81 
Abbott Laboratories 6.83 34.41 
ACF Industries, Inc. 12.50 86.57 
Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. 6.38 67.48 
Albany International Corp. 15.31 34.61 
Alco Standard Corp. 19.19 70.82 
Allegheny International, Inc. 0.60 57.53 
The Allen Group, Inc. 13.36 85.39 
Allied Corp. 10.71 66.00 
Aluminum Co. of America 8.30 75.44 
Amerace Corp. 15.47 64.72 
Koppers Company 11.09 38.62 
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TABLE 31 
U. S. DOMESTIC FIRMS—1976 SAMPLE 
Name of Firm PS/PPS_Debt/Equity 
Alabama By-products Corporation 15.02 43.51 
Armstrong Rubber Co. 24.49 107.64 
Bluebird, Inc. 15.35 34.37 
Brockway Glass Co. 16.43 36.63 
Browning Ferris Industries, Inc. 10.48 82.35 
Circle K Corp. 12.69 36.13 
Dayton-Hudson Corp. 12.76 50.74 
Dean Foods Co. 20.08 45.24 
Dorchester Gas Corp. 14.26 21.26 
Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates 13.56 61.37 
Fabri-Centers of America 13.71 44.57 
First Mississippi Corp. 13.22 70.21 
Flowers Industries, Inc. 7.72 62.89 
General Cinema Corp. 13.62 65.34 
Genral Portland, Inc. 0.32 - 36.50 
Hammermill Paper Co. 13.73 63.88 
Harte-Hanks Communications 10.29 29.99 
Kaiser Steel Corp. 16.16 40.15 
Lucky Stores, Inc. 7.77 30.46 
Marshall Field & Co. 9.55 14.76 
McDonough Co. 23.37 20.60 
Media General, Inc. 12.77 28.68 
The Mohawk Rubber Co. 26.42 86.85 
Munsingwear, Inc. 7.94 47.02 
G. C. Murphy Co. 12.90 39.00 
Outlet Co. 21.59 114.82 
Pargas, Inc. 12.52 78.48 
Potlatch Corp. 10.63 45.62 
Russell Corp. 12.47 39.57 
Skaggs Cos., Inc. 9.20 3.17 
Stone Container Corp. 17.94 76.55 
Super Valu Stores, Inc. 11.88 27.81 
Texas American Energy Corp. 7.56 138.55 
Texas Oil & Gas Corp. 10.51 83.15 
Ti Caro, Inc. 28.67 26.69 
Tultex Corp. 40.54 71.56 
Tyler Corp. 20.05 41.96 
Wetterau, Inc. 11.01 47.06 
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TABLE 32 
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS—1975 SAMPLE 
Name of Firm_EPS/PPS_Debt/Equity 
Allied Stores Corp. 21.52 88.54 
Amcord, Inc. 24.82 100.08 
American Broadcasting Cos. 4.95 60.99 
Amstar Corp. 29.67 46.16 
Associated Dry Goods Corp. 11.98 25.88 
Brown Group, Inc. 10.20 45.01 
Certain-Teed Corp. 11.89 73.04 
Diebold, Inc. 8.55 33.37 
Equifax, Inc. 14.56 5.71 
Gannett Co., Inc. 6.47 9.39 
Greif Bros. Corp. 15.43 4.03 
Kane-Miller Corp. 34.08 77.65 
Southdown, Inc. 17.53 124.16 
American Petrofina, Inc. 10.14 10.41 
Anchor Hocking Corp. 15.84 18.47 
The Cessna Aircraft Co. 12.93 42.78 
Champion International Corp. 12.95 103.21 
Conagra, Inc. 15.52 166.88 
DWG Corp. 30.43 61.89 
Eagle Picher Inc., Inc. 18.46 43.60 
Essex Chemical Corp. 20.90 38.97 
Galveston Houston Co. 25.27 127.32 
Acme Cleveland Corp. 17.95 57.08 
Athlone Industries, Inc. 31.06 113.54 
The Boeing Co. 15.04 13.16 
Copperweld Corp. 22.80 13.17 
Inland Steel Co. 11.47 52.53 
Insilco Corp. 18.78 79.57 
Kaneb Services, Inc. 5.67 129.52 
NFVF Co. 11.69 34.79 
Pacific Resources, Inc. 8.67 210.02 
Quaker State Oil Refining 8.00 34.61 
Tyco Laboratories, Inc. 11.26 132.99 
Abbott Laboratories 7.75 52.02 
ACF Industries, Inc. 13.14 91.68 
Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. 6.45 63.19 
Albany International Corp. 6.46 38.27 
Alco Standard Corp. 23.81 84.33 
Allegheny International, Inc. 21.26 44.59 
The Allen Group, Inc. 14.38 106.95 
Allied Corp. 12.03 69.06 
Aluminum Co. of America 4.81 87.44 
Arnerace Corp. 16.56 58.13 
Koppers Company 17.46 41.76 
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TABLE 33 
U. S. DOMESTIC FIRMS- -1975 SAMPLE 
Name of Firm EPS/PPS Debt/Equity 
Alabama By-products Corporation 8.67 56.1 
American Stores Co. 11.59 18.98 
Armstrong Rubber Co. 14.76 125.78 
Bluebird, Inc. 24.00 46.54 
Brockway Glass Co. 18.72 29.16 
Browning Ferris Industries, Inc. 4.14 87.79 
Caesars World, Inc. 6.06 238.07 
Circle K Corp. 13.26 34.72 
Dayton-Hudson Corp. 18.40 61.08 
Dean Foods Co. 19.95 46.54 
Dorchester Gas Corp. 8.81 40.71 
Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates 15.88 71.50 
Fabri-Centers of America 19.76 26.07 
First Mississippi Corp. 32.00 80.67 
Flowers Industries, Inc. 17.34 57.98 
General Cinema Corp. 16.62 86.50 
General Portland, Inc. 1.13 43.02 
Hammermill Paper Co. 14.91 58.91 
Harte-Hanks Communications 14.07 16.29 
Kaiser Steel Corp. 32.85 34.39 
Lucky Stores, Inc. 9.52 34.92 
Marshall Field & Co. 10.09 9.94 
McDonough Co. 31.63 25.82 
Media General, Inc. 13.33 34.81 
The Mohawk Rubber Co. 27.43 114.15 
Munsingwear, Inc. 13.00 29.94 
G. C. Murphy Co. 18.01 28.27 
Outlet Co. 25.99 86.50 
Pargas, Inc. 12.74 82.82 
Potlatch Corp. 13.29 34.81 
Russell Corp. 38.46 49.59 
Skaggs Cos., Inc. 12.06 18.98 
Stone Container Corp. 27.68 66.89 
Super Valu Stores, Inc. 16.45 33.39 
Ti Caro, Inc. 18.47 33.30 
Tultex Corp. 14.29 91.20 
Tyler Corp. 28.99 79.73 
Wetterau, Inc. 12.09 45.01 
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TABLE 34 
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS--!974 SAMPLE 
ilUIII^ U 1 1 1 1 III 
Allied Stores Corp. 
c.r:>/ rro 
21.48 
ueDi/tquity 
105.09 
Amcord, Inc: 24.08 108.51 
American Broadcasting Cos. '14.71 36.26 
Amstar Corp. 27.16 58.25 
Associated Dry Goods Corp. 12.38 28.44 
Brown Group, Inc. 11.62 31.27 
Diebold, Inc. 7.13 35.96 
Gannett Co., Inc. 5.47 17.73 
Greif Bros. Corp. 28.59 8.75 
Kane-Miller Corp. 31.28 74.59 
Southdown, Inc. 30.35 111.28 
American Petrofina, Inc. 25.73 13.13 
Anchor Hocking Corp. 15.67 10.23 
The Cessna Aircraft Co. 18.64 37.44 
Champion International Corp. 21.08 105.97 
Eagle Picher Ind., Inc. 20.95 53.47 
Essex Chemical Corp. 29.71 64.23 
Galveston Houston Co. 13.50 210.08 
Acme Cleveland Corp. 13.22 68.07 
Athlone Industries, Inc. 32.65 117.58 
The Boeing Co. 21.19 15.59 
Copperweld Corp. 29.82 16.20 
Inland Steel Co. 24.73 41.78 
Insilco Corp. 20.81 67.20 
Kaneb Services, Inc. 6.42 125.02 
NVF Co. 22.45 35.67 
Quaker State Oil Refining 6.81 31.29 
Tyco Laboratories, Inc. 15.63 172.78 
Abbott Laboratories 8.74 55.59 
ACF Industries, Inc. 11.26 94.70 
Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. 6.43 68.15 
Albany International Corp. 16.84 41.02 
Alco Standard Corp. 30.05 57.98 
The Allen Group, Inc. 16.79 118.67 
Allis Chalmers Corp. 20.97 60.10 
Aluminum Co. of America 12.84 68.63 
Arnerace Corp. 29.19 62.23 
Arvin Industries, Inc. 7.89 81.19 
Koppers Company 18.55 61.13 
Matin Marietta Corp. 22.54 48.63 
U. S. Industries, Inc. 11.03 22.52 
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TABLE 35 
U. S. DOMESTIC FIRMS—1974 SAMPLE 
Name of Finn_EPS/PPS_Debt/Equity 
Alabama By-products Corporation 20.61 48.06 
American Stores Co. 18.90 70.36 
Armstrong Rubber Co. 12.14 120.51 
Bluebird, Inc. 19.73 59.90 
Brockway Glass Co. 20.91 25.05 
Browning Ferris Industries, Inc. 11.47 91.50 
Caesars World, Inc. 31.68 241.76 
Circle K Corp. 14.00 39.24 
Dayton-Hudson Corp. 16.97 74.40 
Dean Foods Co. 12.16 34.66 
Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates 23.49 120.17 
Fabri-Centers of America 22.19 15.85 
First Mississippi Corp. 12.63 213.77 
Flowers Industries, Inc. 19.32 59.97 
General Cinema Corp. 20.74 109.34 
General Portland, Inc. 2.97 40.90 
W. W. Grainger, Inc. 4.91 31.27 
Hammermill Paper Co. 30.23 53.99 
Harte-Hanks Communications 17.90 15.83 
Kaiser Steel Corp. 45.32 40.88 
Loehmann's, Inc. 21.10 5.37 
Marshall Field & Co. 13.31 10.73 
McDonough Co. 32.45 33.39 
The Mohawk Rubber Co. 9.51 130.84 
Munsingwear, Inc. 1.89 36.65 
G. C. Murphy Co. 17.24 30.31 
Outlet Co. 30.61 93.57 
Pargas, Inc. 15.80 65.52 
Potlatch Corp. 22.33 38.18 
Russell Corp. 43.82 39.45 
Skaggs Cos., Inc. 19.26 24.12 
Stone Container Corp. 40.23 84.77 
Super Valu Stores, Inc. 18.27 63.40 
Tyler Corp. 27.29 125.02 
Westmoreland Coal Company 34.06 13.68 
Wetterau, Inc. 8.26 49.93 
Vulcan Materials Co. 19.63 32.59 
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TABLE 36 
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS—1973 SAMPLE 
Name of Firm EPS/PPS Debt/Equity 
Allied Stores Corp. 13.55 114.18 
Amcord, Inc. 14.45 93.72 
American Broadcasting Cos. 9.37 41.74 
Amstar Corp, 12.79 70.97 
Associated Dry Goods Corp. 8.99 30.94 
Brown Group, Inc. 12.01 35.94 
Certain-Teed Corp. 12.61 63.51 
Diebold, Inc. 4.91 20.05 
Gannett Co., Inc. 3.72 27.75 
Greif Bros. Corp. 11.71 11.45 
Kane-Miller Corp. 26.15 72.86 
Southdown, Inc. 19.20 105.00 
American Petrofina, Inc. 11.73 17.41 
Anchor Hocking Corp. 11.91 11.91 
The Cessna Aircraft Co. 11.04 38.47 
Champion International Corp. 14.16 95.92 
Conagra, Inc. 15.37 94.42 
Eagle Picher Inc., Inc, 12.71 58.38 
Essex Chemical Corp. 20.23 73.01 
Acme Cleveland Corp. 11.84 14.48 
Athlone Industries, Inc. 32.29 143.31 
The Boeing Co. 12.28 18.32 
Copperweld Corp. 20.84 20.99 
Inland Steel Co. 14.66 41.24 
Insilco Corp. 12.28 54.08 
Quaker State Oil Refining 3.71 34.61 
Tyco Laboratories, Inc. 15.99 155.04 
Abbott Laboratories 5.23 30.33 
ACF Industries, Inc. 9.65 86.78 
Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. 4.16 62.23 
Albany International Corp. 10.62 32.22 
Alco Standard Corp. 18.87 76.12 
The Allen Group, Inc. 11.27 91.13 
Allis Chalmers Corp. 11.95 57.26 
Aluminum Co. of America 6.89 71.32 
Arnerace Corp. 14.52 61.73 
Arvin Industries, Inc. 6.26 71.79 
Koppers Company 13.56 49.32 
Matin Marietta Corp. 28.00 63.32 
U. S. Industries, Inc. 13.23 24.69 
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TABLE 37 
U. S. DOMESTIC FIRMS—1973 SAMPLE 
Alabama By-products Corporation 
cn/rn 
12.03 
ueDi/tgui zy 
28.67 
American Stores Co. 23.55 26.86 
Armstrong Rubber Co. 12.41 86.12 
Bluebird, Inc. 17.47 102.55 
Brockway Glass Co. 11.71 30.41 
Browning Ferris Industries, Inc. 4.14 69.72 
Caesars World, Inc. 33.51 148.51 
Circle K Corp. 4.40 44.55 
Dayton-Hudson Corp. 9.61 79.24 
Dean Foods Co. 10.62 40.29 
Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates 8.35 150.13 
Fabri-Centers of America 10.37 19.59 
First Mississippi Corp. 1.93 88.18 
Flowers Industries, Inc. 11.13 68.92 
General Cinema Corp. 7.64 126.76 
General Portland, Inc. 5.63 39.35 
W. W. Grainger, Inc. 3.81 19.29 
Hammermill Paper Co. 14.97 63.80 
Harte-Hanks Communications 17.67 18.12 
Kaiser Steel Corp. 53.18 68.21 
Loehmann's Inc. 12.23 7.20 
Lucky Stores, Inc. 7.54 50.34 
Marshall Field & Co. 8.62 11.74 
McDonough Co. 16.70 41.76 
The Mohawk Rubber Co. 15.65 132.02 
Munsingwear, Inc. 10.00 41 .27 
G. C. Murphy Co. 12.06 31.60 
Pargas, Inc. 10.71 76.87 
Potlatch Corp. 17.66 47.32 
Russell Corp. 19.24 47.78 
Skaggs Cos,, Inc. 8.16 25.02 
Stone Container Corp. 18.70 82.85 
Super Valu Stores, Inc. 12.60 77.15 
Tyler Corp. 17.28 150.19 
Westmoreland Coal Company 6.47 39.33 
Wetterau, Inc. 6.73 24.10 
Vulcan Materials Co. 15.84 35.61 

